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OVERVIEW
Over the past seven terms, the Supreme Court has issued six per-
sonal jurisdiction decisions in which it concluded that the United
States Constitution protected the defendant from being sued in the
forum chosen by the plaintiff. In all but one of the cases, the defen-
dant was a large corporate defendant, and in the other case, the defen-
dant was a law enforcement official who was sued over the way in
which he carried out his official duties.1 In only one of those six cases,
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,2 do I believe that the outcome
was erroneous under the current understanding of the application of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 But in all of
them, the difficulty is both with the premise that the Due Process
Clause is the proper constitutional approach and that the Court’s divi-
sion of personal jurisdiction into general and specific has any basis in
the Constitution or is a useful means of resolving these cases. Instead,
if the issue is whether hailing a defendant into a particular forum is
constitutional, the proper tool is the Dormant Commerce Clause,
which at one time was the principal defense against plaintiffs’ forum
shopping, and today is a well-tailored means of resolving similar kinds
of constitutional questions.
In the first part of Section I of this Article, I give a brief overview of
the Court’s treatment of personal jurisdiction, beginning with
Pennoyer v. Neff.4 There, the Court announced that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment placed limits on the ability of
states to bring out-of-state defendants into their courts, and I argue
that there is no textual or other basis for utilizing that provision for
that purpose. I next argue that the current test for personal jurisdic-
tion—focusing on purposeful availment—is dysfunctional and that the
recent effort to place all personal jurisdiction cases into either the
Court-created narrow categories of general or specific jurisdiction has
no basis in the Constitution and has destroyed what was a reasonable
balance between the rights of plaintiffs and defendants. Increasingly,
these decisions result in plaintiffs being unable to sue business defend-
ants except in the relative safety of the defendants’ home jurisdictions.
In Section II, I advocate for the replacement of the Due Process
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment with an analysis under the
Dormant Commerce Clause. There is, of course, no express textual
justification for either approach, but the Supreme Court has reached a
1. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 280–81 (2014).
2. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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general consensus on how to analyze Dormant Commerce Clause
cases to determine whether a particular state law places an undue bur-
den on a business challenging it, which is essentially the question that
personal jurisdiction cases are asked to answer. I then revisit recent
Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decisions and apply the Dormant
Commerce Clause to them and, most significantly, to a sample of the
cases that will almost certainly arise as businesses try to reduce further
the jurisdictions in which they can be sued. If the Court continues to
apply the Due Process Clause as it has recently, business defendants
(mainly but not exclusively corporations) will further undermine what
was once the established understanding of where plaintiffs could bring
suit. By contrast, employing the Dormant Commerce Clause will re-
store that balance, while providing ample protection to corporate de-
fendants. And, to the extent that the Dormant Commerce Clause does
not offer reasonable protection for defendants, other doctrines, such
as venue, transfer of forum, and forum non conveniens, are available.
Nevertheless, the Court has declined to use them in several of these
cases, instead insisting on ruling on constitutional grounds.5 In Section
III, I briefly discuss a renewal of an old technique to obtaining per-
sonal jurisdiction: using a business’s registration with the state as a
form of consent to be sued there. Finally, in Section IV, I preliminarily
explore two related issues: What is the constitutional basis for protect-
ing out-of-state individuals against whom non-business claims are
made, and whether there is a basis for different personal jurisdiction
rules in federal court than those that apply in state court.
INTRODUCTION
Debates about personal jurisdiction, whether in the classroom or in
court, often have a legalistic atmosphere about them, masking what is
at stake in these cases: the ability of both plaintiffs and defendants to
forum shop. Whatever may have been true in the days of Pennoyer or
even International Shoe Co. v. Washington,6 the burdens imposed on a
party in having to sue or defend in a distant forum are quite modest in
these days where travel is convenient and lawyers litigate nationwide.
The costs of travel are, for the kinds of cases in which personal juris-
diction battles are worth having, only a small fraction of the other
costs, including attorneys’ fees, that each party will have to bear.
Moreover, if one forum is more convenient for plaintiff, then another
will be more convenient for defendant, and there is no judicially-man-
5. See discussion infra note 67.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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ageable way to compare the relative inconveniences or burdens of the
parties or to decide the question on that basis.
There can be no doubt that the battles over personal jurisdiction are
battles about forum shopping as evidenced by two cases decided by
the Supreme Court in 2017. In BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrell,7 two
plaintiffs sued their railroad employer in Montana state court over
work-related injuries under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act.8
One plaintiff, a resident of North Dakota, was injured while working
for BNSF as a fuel truck driver in Washington State, and the other was
the surviving spouse of a South Dakota resident, who alleged he had
contracted cancer while working at various locations outside of Mon-
tana for BNSF over a period of years.9 In recent years, a large number
of injured workers had sued BNSF in the Montana state courts, not
because it was convenient to where their injury occurred or because
they resided in the forum state. Instead, it was because the plaintiffs
(or more precisely their lawyers) believed that they would achieve a
more favorable result there than if they sued elsewhere.
In the Supreme Court case, the railroad argued only lack of rele-
vant contacts for these claims, not inconvenience, because it had a
very significant presence in Montana.10 According to BNSF, because
the injuries to the plaintiffs did not occur in Montana, the cases could
only be brought in Texas, where the railroad was headquartered, or in
Delaware, its state of incorporation.11 BNSF did not appear to object
to having one of the cases brought in Washington where the injury to
one plaintiff happened, but it did not suggest where the widow of the
cancer victim could properly sue other than in Texas or Delaware.
7. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
8. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (2012).
9. Brief for Respondents at 7, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017) (No. 16-405),
2017 WL 1192088, at *7.
10. The unrebutted Brief for Respondents described BNSF’s Montana presence this way:
It owns and operates more than 2,100 miles of rail lines there, and in 2013, BNSF’s
freight trains logged more than 40 million locomotive miles traversing the state. Since
2010, it has opened approximately 40 new facilities in the state, . . . and its facilities
include an economic development office . . . . BNSF employs more than 2,200 people in
Montana. BNSF earned more than $1.7 billion in 2013 from its Montana operations.
BNSF has developed a de facto monopoly over rail shipping in Montana. Its in-state
activities dwarf those of Union Pacific, the only other Class I carrier operating in the
state, which owns a mere 125 miles of track. Montana Rail Link (MRL), a domestic
carrier in the state, also operates on several hundred miles of tracks but leases those
tracks from BNSF. Since 1987, MRL has maintained an agreement with BNSF that
gives BNSF significant control over MRL’s pricing when MRL moves freight off its
lines to other carriers.
Id. at 5–6 (citations and footnotes omitted).
11. Brief for Petitioner at 4, BNSF, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (No. 16-405).
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Similarly, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, the defen-
dant, based in New York and New Jersey, was already being sued in
California by 86 California residents. Yet the defendant objected to
having 592 residents from 33 other states join in those lawsuits be-
cause none of them alleged that they had sustained injuries in Califor-
nia and consequently lacked what Bristol-Myers said were the
relevant contacts.12 The claims in these cases were that the defen-
dant’s drug, Plavix, was defective and injured the plaintiffs, and the
main difference among the cases was the location where the plaintiffs
took the drug. In joining the non-resident plaintiffs, the California
plaintiffs pointed out that, although Plavix was not designed or manu-
factured in California, Bristol-Myers has very substantial business op-
erations there.13
It is almost always to the advantage of plaintiffs to bring many
claims together. This is what the plaintiffs did in these Plavix cases,
and their lawyers also chose California because they believed that its
state courts would produce a better outcome for their clients. Bristol-
Myers agreed that the non-California plaintiffs could aggregate their
claim, but only in the jurisdiction where they took the drug or in the
defendant’s home states.14 It is clear that Bristol-Myers, like BNSF, is
a forum-shopping case on both sides, with plaintiffs having the initial
choice because they have to decide where to file, and defendants then
trying to have the case heard in some other forum in which they be-
lieve that they will obtain a better outcome. In the end, cases against
U.S. defendants can always be brought somewhere in this country, but
the important question is where.15
12. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).
13. “Five of the company’s research and laboratory facilities, which employ a total of around
160 employees, are located there. BMS also employs about 250 sales representatives in Califor-
nia and maintains a small state-government advocacy office in Sacramento.” Id. at 1778. In addi-
tion, “[b]etween 2006 and 2012, it sold almost 187 million Plavix pills in the State and took in
more than $900 million from those sales.” Id.
14. Id. at 1783.
15. As discussed in the paragraphs containing infra notes 74–78, some of the Court’s recent
decisions may make it impossible to sue foreign defendants in the United States, not simply in
the cases in which the Court has ruled to date, but in other more common situations that may
affect a large number of U.S. residents.
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I. THE COURT SHOULD NO LONGER USE THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATE COURT ASSERTIONS OF PERSONAL
JURISDICTION
A. The Lack of Textual Basis
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
“nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.”16 For 140 years, beginning with Pennoyer
v. Neff,17 the Court has relied on that clause in deciding whether to
strike down the efforts of states to expand the reach of their courts.
But the ruling in Pennoyer that the Due Process Clause forbade the
state from reaching beyond its borders was an almost offhand ruling,
not justified by the text of the Clause, the opinion, or any of the
Court’s prior precedents.18
This is the totality of what the Court said in finding that the Due
Process Clause is the basis of the limitation:
Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, the validity of such judgments may be directly ques-
tioned, and their enforcement in the State resisted, on the ground
that proceedings in a court of justice to determine the personal
rights and obligations of parties over whom that court has no juris-
diction do not constitute due process of law.19
According to the Court, the words Due Process “mean a course of
legal proceedings according to those rules and principles which have
been established in our systems of jurisprudence for the protection
and enforcement of private rights.”20 But the Court did not further
elaborate—based on text or even history—why the substantive au-
thority of a state court to exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident de-
fendant is found in the “rules and principles” governing legal
proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
18. The literature on the constitutional limits of state court personal jurisdiction is extensive.
The most significant articles, as of November 2010, are listed in Todd David Peterson, The Tim-
ing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 101–02 nn.2–4 (2010).
19. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733. The Court also observed:
To give such proceedings any validity, there must be a tribunal competent by its consti-
tution—that is, by the law of its creation—to pass upon the subject-matter of the suit;
and, if that involves merely a determination of the personal liability of the defendant,
he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the State, or his
voluntary appearance.
Id. However, that sensible conclusion does not answer the question of the constitutional basis, if
any, for it.
20. Id.
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The Pennoyer decision lacked an explanation of why the Due Pro-
cess Clause limited the power of Oregon. A likely reason for this is
that neither of the briefs submitted to the Court, nor the opinion of
the court below made any mention of the Due Process Clause, let
alone argued why it did or did not apply.21 Instead, the focus of those
briefs was on the common law rules limiting the reach of state courts
and the applicable Oregon statutes. The defendant, Neff, was a citizen
of California, and the plaintiff, Pennoyer, was a citizen of Oregon,
which enabled the case to be heard in federal court under its diversity
of citizenship jurisdiction.22 In diversity cases, the federal courts de-
cide questions of state law, even in cases like Pennoyer in which the
claim was, as both parties agreed, a collateral attack on a prior state
court judgment.23
In 1877, there were no intermediate federal courts, so appeals went
directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was not limited to deciding
questions of federal law, as it essentially is now.24 This explains why
the focus of the courts and the parties in Pennoyer was on the Oregon
statutes governing jurisdiction and the common law decisions of other
states as well as the Supreme Court on that issue. Even before Pen-
noyer, no one disputed that there were some limits on the reach of
state courts although the legal basis for them appears to have been a
common law understanding, something akin to natural law, or as my
colleague Roger Trangsrud called it in his article by that title: “The
Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction.”25
21. See Brief of James K. Kelly for Defendant in Error, Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (No. 669); Brief
and Argument for Plaintiff in Error, Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (No. 669). James K. Kelly is the
attorney for Neff.
22. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 717; Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error, Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714
(No. 669).
23. A collateral attack is a lawsuit which challenges a judgment in a case which has already
become final and not subject to further review (whether by appeal or certiorari) in that case.
Collateral attacks are the exception to the rule of finality, but they are allowed in cases like
Pennoyer, in which the plaintiff in the second case claims that it was never properly made a party
in the first case.
24. SUP. CT. R. 10.
25. Roger H. Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 849 (1989). Another case, Galpin v. Page, was cited in the briefs of both parties in
Pennoyer, and it illustrated the non-constitutional way in which the courts derived these limits
on state courts:
The tribunals of one State have no jurisdiction over the persons of other States unless
found within their territorial limits; they cannot extend their process into other States,
and any attempt of the kind would be treated in every other forum as an act of usurpa-
tion without any binding efficacy. “The authority of every judicial tribunal, and the
obligation to obey it,” says Burge, in his Commentaries, “are circumscribed by the lim-
its of the territory in which it is established.” “No sovereignty,” says Story, in his Con-
flict of Laws, “can extend its process beyond its own territorial limits, to subject either
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL304.txt unknown Seq: 8 29-MAY-19 16:54
524 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68:517
The lengthy dissent of Justice Hunt in Pennoyer26 is instructive on
how Due Process became the basis of the majority opinion. The dis-
sent quoted a number of decisions, including the ruling by Justice
Field, sitting as a Circuit Judge in Galpin v. Page,27 in which the
phrase “due process of law” appears in connection with similar issues
relating to notice and attachment, as well as personal jurisdiction gen-
erally. In none of those references is there a connection made to the
Fourteenth Amendment, which is understandable because a number
of these decisions were issued well before 1868 when that Amend-
ment was adopted. Rather, the phrase seems to be used in the sense
that it represents basic notions of fairness regarding when and how,
among other things, notice should be provided to defendants of pro-
ceedings against them. The main difference between the majority and
dissent in Pennoyer was whether the time of attachment was a ques-
tion left up to each state, as the dissent concluded, or whether the
right to have the defendant’s property attached before judgment was
mandatory, as the majority concluded.28 The decision in Pennoyer
could have been based on the common law as it was then understood,
without having to decide the constitutional issue of the territorial
persons or property to its judicial decisions. Every exertion of authority of this sort
beyond this limit is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such persons or property in
any other tribunals.” And in Picquet v. Swan, the same learned justice says: “The courts
of a State, however general may be their jurisdiction, are necessarily confined to the
territorial limits of the State. Their process cannot be executed beyond those limits; and
any attempt to act upon persons or things beyond them would be deemed a usurpation
of foreign sovereignty, not justified or acknowledged by the law of nations. Even the
Court of King’s Bench, in England, though a court of general jurisdiction, never
imagined that it could serve process in Scotland, Ireland, or the colonies, to compel an
appearance, or justify a judgment against persons residing therein at the time of the
commencement of the suit. This results from the general principle that a court created
within and for a particular territory is bounded in the exercise of its powers by the
limits of such territory. It matters not whether it be a kingdom, a state, a county, or a
city, or other local district. If it be the former, it is necessarily bounded and limited by
the sovereignty of the government itself, which cannot be extra-territorial; if the latter,
then the judicial interpretation is that the sovereign has chosen to assign this special
limit, short of his general authority.”
Galpin v. Page, 85 U.S. 350, 367–68 (1873) (footnotes omitted). The basis of these limits, pre-
Fourteenth Amendment, were subsequently described “as a result of applying fundamental prin-
ciples of justice and the rules of international law as they existed among the states at the incep-
tion of the government.” Baker v. Baker Eccles & Co., 242 U.S. 394, 401 (1917).
26. 95 U.S. at 736–48 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
27. 9 F. Cas. 1126, 1134 (C.C.D. Cal. 1874).
28. Compare Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 737–38 (Hunt, J., dissenting), with id. at 728 (plurality opin-
ion) respectively.
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reach of state courts, on which the Court’s subsequent personal juris-
diction jurisprudence was founded.29
The question of whether a state court may enter a valid judgment
against an out-of-state defendant is not procedural in the ordinary
meaning of that term, nor does it fit easily within the phrase “due
process” in the Fourteenth Amendment. Those terms include at least
the right to meaningful notice, to an opportunity to be heard, and to
know the evidence on which the decision will be based.30 But the right
not to be forced to litigate in a distant state is a different kind of right:
No matter what procedural rights are available to a defendant, the
defendant may still object that the state court is attempting to exercise
power over that defendant that it does not have. In that situation, the
objection is not procedural, but is substantive, because no amount of
process can cure it.31 Put another way, procedural due process must be
provided only when there is some recognized substantive right to be
protected.32 For that reason, when personal jurisdiction is the issue,
the proper source of that substantive right is not found in the procedu-
ral protections of the Fourteenth Amendment itself, but somewhere
else, which I argue below is the Dormant Commerce Clause.33
29. If the majority in Pennoyer had wanted to rule in favor of Neff, without using the Four-
teenth Amendment, it could also have relied on two provisions of the Oregon Code that appear
to limit attachments to situations in which the absent defendant currently has property in the
state. Section 506 provided the circumstances in which Oregon courts would have jurisdiction,
one of which is where the defendants “have property [in the state]; and in [that] case only to the
extent of such property at the time that the jurisdiction attached.” Brief of James K. Kelly for
Defendant in Error at 9, Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (No. 669) (quoting Or. Code § 506); see also id.
at 8 (citing Or. Code § 55, ¶ 3 to the same effect). Had the Court followed that route, it then
would have had to confront Section 57 of the Oregon Code which provides rules on the sale of
property pursuant to a judgment obtained through notice by publication, the last of which states
that “title to property sold upon such judgment to a purchaser in good faith, shall not thereby be
affected.” Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error at 21–22, Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (No. 669)
(quoting Or. Code § 57). Presumably, the invocation of the Constitution overrode that statute
and thereby awarded title to Neff, not Pennoyer, which the sub-constitutional approach illus-
trated in note 19 supra would not have been able to do.
30. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr.
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
31. See, e.g., Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
32. See also Trangsrud, supra note 25, at 898–903 (establishing that the protections in personal
jurisdiction cases are substantive and not procedural limitations).
33. Over vigorous dissents, the Court has also relied on the Due Process Clause to attempt to
control the substantive law of punitive damages, with line drawing difficulties not dissimilar to
those for personal jurisdiction. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 429–39
(2003) (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., & Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The one aspect of State Farm which did
permit sensible law drawing—excluding harms that occurred outside the state from the calcula-
tion, id. at 421–22—could readily be achieved through a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of
the kind proposed in Section II infra.
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This is not to suggest that Pennoyer reached the wrong conclusion
on whether Neff’s Due Process rights had been violated. The default
judgment against Neff was almost certainly void for lack of procedural
due process, at least under today’s standards, because the plaintiff
Mitchell made no effort to assure that Neff had notice of the lawsuit
or of the sale of Neff’s property following the default judgment
against him.34 As a result, as the Court later ruled in Mullane v. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the attempt at notice was invalid as no
more than “a mere gesture,” because “[t]he means employed must be
such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reason-
ably adopt to accomplish it.”35
Pennoyer was just the beginning, and it dealt with what could fairly
be described as procedures, albeit with a significant substantive im-
pact. The seminal personal jurisdiction case on the territorial reach of
state courts is International Shoe Co. v. Washington.36 There, the
Court expanded the situations in which a state could exercise personal
jurisdiction over an out-of-state party, but it provided no further justi-
fication for the conclusion that Due Process was the source of that
protection. The company argued “that its activities within the state
were not sufficient to manifest its ‘presence’ there and that, in its ab-
sence, the state courts were without jurisdiction, [and] that conse-
quently it was a denial of Due Process for the state to subject
appellant to suit.”37 The Court accepted the Due Process premise, but
found that it was satisfied because the defendant had “certain mini-
mum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.’”38 Again, as in Pennoyer, there is no discussion of why the Due
34. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 719–20 (1877). Mitchell’s pleading recited that Neff was a
California resident, whose whereabouts were not known to Mitchell. Given all that is known
about Mitchell, the truth of that averment is subject to considerable doubt. Moreover, since the
original case involved a routine default judgment for failure to appear, it is quite unlikely that
the judge actually inquired into the factual basis for this claim of Mitchell or even whether Neff
had property in Oregon or when he acquired it.
35. 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). Before discussing notice in Mullane, Justice Jackson first had to
establish that the New York courts could adjudicate the rights of the beneficiaries of the trust at
issue there insofar as they were non-residents of the forum state. He does this mainly by assert-
ing that New York must have jurisdiction, without explaining on what basis. Id. at 313. A more
direct way to reach that result would be to treat an intangible trust created under New York law,
with assets held in a New York bank, as if the trust were a piece of real property over which the
New York courts would plainly have in rem jurisdiction. Because New York would surely have
the power to regulate such a trust, that same result would also follow if the Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis proposed below were followed.
36. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
37. Id. at 315.
38. Id. at 316.
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Process Clause created these limits on state power. Moreover, no sub-
sequent case has questioned the applicability of the Due Process
Clause to state court personal jurisdiction nor elaborated on the basis
for it.39
One additional and often overlooked point about International
Shoe is that the State’s merits claim was that the company had
wrongly failed to pay the unemployment taxes due for the employees
who sold its shoes in Washington. Because the company used the same
system for selling shoes in states other than Missouri, where it had its
headquarters, and because the amount of the Washington tax at issue
was only $3,159.24, it is almost certain that the company was princi-
pally concerned with its total tax liability outside of Missouri if the
Washington tax were upheld.40 Because the Supreme Court had little
difficulty with the tax issue, the only reason it would need to discuss
the personal jurisdiction defense was to expand the ability of states to
hail non-resident defendants to answer claims in their courts. Indeed,
Justice Black’s concurring opinion expressed concern that the Court
had unduly limited plaintiffs in their choice of forum, but gave no ex-
amples of how the majority’s test would have that effect.41
B. The Current Test Is Dysfunctional
In addition to its questionable pedigree, the Due Process minimum
contacts test has been reformulated into the unhelpful question of
whether the defendant “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State.”42 McIntyre is emblem-
atic of how few questions the current test sensibly answers. In McIn-
tyre, a British manufacturer sold a three-ton shearing machine to a
39. Ironically, under the Court’s present personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, the Oregon state
court would almost certainly have had jurisdiction over Neff if he had received actual notice of
the lawsuit without regard to Neff’s property in Oregon or whether it had been validly attached.
The complaint alleged that Mitchell performed $253.14 worth of legal services for Neff in Ore-
gon relating to the acquisition of land in Oregon, which would have satisfied the minimum con-
tacts requirement of International Shoe. See Brief and Argument for Plaintiff in Error at 2,
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714 (No. 669).
40. Appellant’s Brief at 3, 5, Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (No. 107), 1945 WL 27431, at *3, 5.
41. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 322–26 (Black, J., concurring). Justice Black also argued that the
authority of the state to impose the tax at issue was so clear that “the question seems so patently
frivolous as to make the case a fit candidate for dismissal.” Id. at 322.
42. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 877 (2011) (quoting Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). Although the Hanson opinion did use that term, it was in the
very different context in which a Florida court sought to obtain personal jurisdiction over a
corporate trustee with offices only in Delaware, over a trust formed in Delaware, with all its
assets located there, and no connection with Florida, other than the fact the settlor of the trust,
who was by then deceased, moved there after the trust had been created. Hanson, 357 U.S. at
253–54.
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scrap metal dealer in New Jersey whose employee was injured by the
machine and sued McIntyre in New Jersey state court.43 McIntyre UK
had sold its products in the United States through an exclusive distrib-
utor in Ohio.44 The machine in question was one of no more than four
such products that McIntyre ever sold in New Jersey. Furthermore,
there was no evidence that McIntyre “targeted” the state for business
by seeking to sell other machines there, although it admitted to at-
tempting to sell throughout the United States, or by otherwise seeking
to take advantage of the laws of New Jersey.45 On those facts, the
Court set aside the ruling that the state court had personal jurisdiction
over the manufacturer because of a lack of “purposeful availment” to
New Jersey regarding this machine.46 There are three major problems
with the purposeful availment formula and the holding in McIntyre.
First, the result is very difficult to reconcile with one aspect of an-
other international products liability case, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson.47 The holding in World-Wide Volkswagen—that
the dealer in New York who sold the allegedly defective car and the
regional distributor for the New York area could not be sued in
Oklahoma where the injuries occurred—is not problematic.48 But,
like the dog that did not bark for Sherlock Holmes,49 there were two
other defendants in World-Wide Volkswagen, the German manufac-
turer and the U.S. importer, that did not contest jurisdiction in
Oklahoma even though there was no claim that they had any direct
connection with the plaintiffs’ injuries in that state. Those defendants
had every incentive to avoid suit in an inconvenient and perhaps
plaintiff-friendly state court, but they never claimed that the state
court did not have personal jurisdiction over them. That was almost
certainly because they concluded that a company that sells its prod-
ucts without geographic restrictions throughout the United States can
be sued in any state where their products cause injuries, based on a
claim that they were defectively designed or manufactured. The prob-
lem is in reconciling that sensible result with a finding of a lack of
personal jurisdiction in McIntyre. Indeed, applying the rationale of In-
ternational Shoe, most students would find the assertion of personal
jurisdiction over the manufacturer of an immobile shearing machine
43. McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 894 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 896.
45. See id. at 877–79 (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 886–87.
47. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
48. Id. at 295.
49. Arthur Conan Doyle, The Adventure of Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE ADVENTURES
AND MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 1, 26 (Harper Bros. ed. 1894).
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for causing an injury in New Jersey, at least as appropriate and fair as
one seeking damages in Oklahoma from a defective automobile that
was driven a thousand miles from where it was purchased, and across
the Atlantic Ocean from where it was designed and manufactured.
Students are even more perplexed when the Due Process compari-
son is made with the outcome in Burnham v. Superior Court.50 Mr.
Burnham, who was recently separated from his wife in New Jersey,
went to California for three days, mainly to visit their children who
lived there with his wife. While there, he was personally served with
process in his wife’s suit for divorce, spousal support, and custody of
their children.51 Students accept the Court’s unanimous conclusion
(albeit with no opinion supported by five Justices) that the California
courts had jurisdiction in the case, mainly because of the common law
tradition validating in-state service, coupled with the fact that every
state would reach the same result as a matter of state law. What stu-
dents cannot accept is that the Court dismissed the suit against McIn-
tyre UK for lack of personal jurisdiction over the injuries allegedly
caused by its dangerous machine, but it allowed the divorce and finan-
cial support claims against Mr. Burnham to move forward, based
solely on his having been served while visiting his children in
California.
The second major problem with the purposeful availment formula
and the holding in McIntyre is that the stated purpose of these Due
Process protections is to assure that state court assertions of personal
jurisdiction do not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice.”52 Perhaps because of the highly subjective nature of those
goals, coupled with similar problems with the purposeful availment
test, it is very difficult to explain to students why assertions of jurisdic-
tion in cases like McIntyre are unfair to the defendant. Although the
Court never said where in the United States the defendant in McIn-
tyre could be sued over its defective machine, it should at least be in
Ohio where its distributor for the entire country was located and to
which the Court presumed McIntyre UK had sent the machine that
injured Mr. Nicastro.53 But if this British company could be sued in
Ohio, or in other states where it sold more than one machine, or in
Nevada where it successfully solicited business from the owner of the
plant where Nicastro worked, it is almost impossible to explain why it
is “unfair” and contrary to principles of “substantial justice” for it to
50. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
51. Id. at 607–08, 623.
52. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
53. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 878 (2011).
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be sued in New Jersey for damages caused there, even if the machine
arrived there via its Ohio distributor.54 And if it could not be sued
anywhere in the United States, students cannot understand how that
comports with International Shoe and the expansion of personal juris-
diction to fit the modern commercial world.
The third major problem is that the purposeful availment approach
is not very helpful to litigants and lower court judges because of the
nebulous nature of the inquiry as applied to many transactions in
modern interstate and foreign commerce. In its effort to supply mean-
ing to “purposeful availment,” the Supreme Court has required that
the parties provide courts with all of the possible relevant facts con-
cerning the defendant’s connection with the forum state. As a result, it
has transformed what should be a simple threshold inquiry into a ma-
jor additional round of litigation, almost wholly unrelated to the mer-
its.55 Consider the facts in McIntyre and what a plaintiff must prove in
a case in which the defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. A plaintiff’s lawyer will now have no choice but to em-
bark on extensive discovery with the defendant (who was hoping to
avoid the suit, at least in part to avoid any discovery) to learn about all
its connections with the forum state, as well as with the distributor and
plaintiff’s employer. Given the Court’s focus on the lack of facts to
support jurisdiction in McIntyre, especially in the concurring opinion
of Justices Breyer and Alito, plaintiff’s counsel would be wise to leave
no stone unturned. In future cases like McIntyre, the plaintiff would
need to gather at least the following information: all sales in the
United States and especially in New Jersey; information on all of de-
fendant’s personnel in the United States; all advertising and promo-
tional activities in the United States; the company’s service and
warranty program for the machine at issue; and by whom and by what
route the machine was delivered. By contrast, as explained in Section
II, if the personal jurisdiction analysis were under the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, that would raise very few factual issues and create very
little need for discovery because the question would be a much sim-
pler one: Does the exercise of jurisdiction over the manufacturer of a
dangerous machine brought into the state impose an undue burden on
interstate or, as in McIntyre, foreign commerce?56
54. Id. at 895 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
55. Courts now engage in a wide-ranging and time intensive “jurisdictional discovery.” See,
e.g., Gourdine v. Karl Storz Endoscopy-Am., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 475, 481 (D.S.C. 2016) (outlin-
ing procedural history involving three separate periods for jurisdictional discovery over eight
months).
56. The record in McIntyre reflects the following facts that should have produced a different
result, even under the plurality’s view of the meaning of “purposeful availment.” The machine
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C. The Rigid Divide Between General & Specific Jurisdiction Is
Without Textual Basis and Is Unworkable
In an effort to clarify and perhaps simplify the doctrine, the Court
has recently divided the world of personal jurisdiction into two rigid
categories—general and specific57—which has created far more
problems than it has solved. General jurisdiction has always been un-
derstood to allow the defendant to be sued on any claim, no matter
where the allegedly wrongful conduct occurred. Until recently, there
were no specific parameters attached to general jurisdiction beyond
requiring substantial operations in the state. Then, for the first time in
Goodyear Dunlap Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown in 2011 and in
Daimler AG v. Bauman three years later, a corporation became sub-
ject to general jurisdiction only where it is “at home,” which includes
its place of incorporation and principal place of business—and proba-
bly nothing more.58 While this assures that there is at least one state
where every U.S. corporation can be sued, that will not be true for
most foreign corporations. By contrast, specific jurisdiction requires
less, and is established by showing that the claim arose in, or was re-
lated to, the jurisdiction in which the case was brought. On the basis of
those rulings, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs in both BNSF
and Bristol-Myers could not establish either general or specific
jurisdiction.59
that was sold to plaintiff’s employer was not assembled in the UK until there was a firm order
for it. Joint Appendix at 135a, McIntyre, 564 U.S. 873 (No. 09-1343). The supposedly-indepen-
dent Ohio distributor never obtained title to the machine and was only paid after the manufac-
turer was paid. Id. at 131a. The warranty was from the manufacturer. Id. at 126a. A sign on the
machine stated that requests for repair parts should be directed to the manufacturer. Id. at 78a.
While the record does not include the actual route by which the machine arrived in New Jersey,
it is inconceivable that this three-ton product was sent from Great Britain to the distributor in
Ohio and then transported to New Jersey, especially because the distributor was located in the
small town of Stow, which is over 30 miles from Lake Erie, through which such a large machine
is likely to have been sent. Id. at 43a, 52a–53a. For those reasons, it was plainly distinguishable
from stream-of-commerce cases like Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987).
57. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).
58. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919; Daimler, 571 U.S. at 136–38.
59. Burnham v. Superior Court was a case in which there was no claim that the defendant had
minimum contacts with the forum state, but personal jurisdiction over him was sustained be-
cause he had been personally served in the state. Although the decision pre-dates the rigid de-
marcation in Goodyear between general and specific jurisdiction, the lack of contacts between
defendant and the forum state means that Burnham must be a general jurisdiction case, and
therefore that Mr. Burnham could have been sued in the forum state for any claim that his wife
had, not simply those related to their marital status. The disconnect between the expansive per-
sonal jurisdiction countenanced in Burnham and the denial of even specific jurisdiction in cases
like McIntyre is even harder to explain to students who are concerned with the reasons for a
given result, and not simply a formalistic justification for it.
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Under this approach to personal jurisdiction, defendants may not
be sued anywhere besides their home, unless there is a specific con-
nection between the claim and the jurisdiction in which the suit was
filed. Many cases, such as the auto accident in Hess v. Pawloski,60 are
easy to decide because the suit against the non-resident was brought
in the jurisdiction where the plaintiff’s injury and the alleged negli-
gence occurred. Others, such as World-Wide Volkswagen (as applied
to the manufacturer and importer), McIntyre (as applied to a danger-
ous machine that was manufactured abroad), and BNSF (as applied to
the plaintiff who contracted cancer while working at many different
job sites), have no clear answers. For World-Wide and McIntyre, it is
clear where the injury to the plaintiff occurred. But if the focus is on
where the wrongful conduct of the defendant took place, that might
be where the product was designed or manufactured, which would not
be in the United States. And for the cancer plaintiff in BNSF, the
place of injury might be where the disease first manifested or was di-
agnosed, or where the worker was exposed to the cancer-causing sub-
stance. Beyond the effects on plaintiffs’ choices of a forum, it is also
troubling that these questions relate to the preliminary and collateral
issue of where the case may be litigated, with every incentive for de-
fendants to drag out the inquiry as long as possible to wear down the
plaintiff. This uncertainty, which has been going on for more than
thirty years, has increased significantly in recent years. It is almost
certain to continue given the complexity of our economy, the multiple
ways in which businesses are organized, and the increased receptivity
of the Court to limit plaintiffs’ choice of a convenient forum. Further-
more, the impact of the Internet will vastly magnify the difficulties of
connecting plaintiffs’ claims and the forum under the current Due
Process approach.61
The Court’s dichotomy between general and specific jurisdiction is
also inconsistent with what was the apparently once-settled expecta-
tions of large corporate defendants and their sophisticated counsel. In
three personal jurisdiction cases before the Court—World-Wide Volk-
swagen, Goodyear, and Daimler—one or more of the defendants did
not contest personal jurisdiction under the “at home” approach, on
which they would now have a substantial chance of prevailing. In
60. 274 U.S. 352 (1927); see also McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (holding that
the sale of a single life insurance policy gave personal jurisdiction for policy-related claim in state
of residence of purchaser).
61. See McIntyre, 564 U.S. at 890–92 (Breyer, J., concurring). See generally Alan M. Trammell
& Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs”, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129
(2015).
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World-Wide Volkswagen, the German manufacturer was plainly not
“at home” in Oklahoma, and it is likely that the flaws in design and
manufacturing defects that caused the injuries to plaintiffs did not
“arise” in Oklahoma. Today, the automobile maker could argue that
there is an insufficient relation to Oklahoma for suit to be brought
there, even though the accident occurred in Oklahoma. At the very
least, defendant manufacturers in similar cases will now have a major
litigable issue unrelated to the merits on which considerable discovery
is likely to be required.
Similarly, in Goodyear, suit was brought in North Carolina state
court against the parent company, an Ohio corporation, as well as
three foreign subsidiaries.62 The claim was based on an accident in
France involving allegedly defective tires made by the subsidiaries
outside the United States. The tires exploded, causing the deaths of
the plaintiffs’ children, who were North Carolina residents. I agree
with the Court’s holding that North Carolina seriously erred in assert-
ing personal jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries under any of the
various approaches.63 Indeed, the case highlights why defendants need
a constitutional basis to prevent states’ expansive efforts to provide
redress for their own citizens.
What is most significant about Goodyear in assessing the Court’s
current personal jurisdiction jurisprudence is that the defendant par-
ent company made no objection to the North Carolina court’s asser-
tion of personal jurisdiction. This is noteworthy because the defendant
was not at home in North Carolina and did nothing in that state that
was in any way connected to the claims of the plaintiffs. Unsurpris-
ingly, the record in Goodyear does not reflect why the parent com-
pany made no such objection to the North Carolina courts or the
Supreme Court. The most likely explanation is that the parent com-
pany simply assumed that, because it was a major supplier of tires in
North Carolina, it could be sued on any claim against it relating to its
tires, no matter where the claim arose. But today, under the Court’s
current general and specific jurisdiction tests, Goodyear USA, the
parent corporation, would surely contest personal jurisdiction in
North Carolina. And it would object to personal jurisdiction not just
in cases where the tires at issue were made by a subsidiary, but even
where the defective tires were designed or manufactured by the par-
ent company, unless they were actually made or sold in the state
where the accident took place.
62. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.
63. Id. at 920–21.
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Daimler is the third case illustrating how the new rigid rules on per-
sonal jurisdiction have unsettled prior assumptions of litigants, schol-
ars, and lower courts. At issue there were claims that an Argentine
subsidiary, allegedly acting in collaboration with Argentine officials in
Argentina, intentionally inflicted serious physical injuries on plaintiffs,
all of whom were Argentine citizens.64 The plaintiffs sued only the
German parent and argued that California could assert general juris-
diction over it by treating its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary as its agent
in California.65 The parent contested personal jurisdiction throughout
the case, but conceded that the U.S. subsidiary, which was incorpo-
rated and had its headquarters in New Jersey, was subject to general
jurisdiction in California, presumably because it did substantial busi-
ness in the state. The Court found that there was no general jurisdic-
tion over the parent,66 a holding that I agree is correct and does not
create any problems for most plaintiffs in most cases in U.S. courts.
But in the next case, the subsidiary will reflect the new understanding
and object to being sued in the forum state, except for claims against it
that arose there.67
In all three of these cases, a sophisticated corporate defendant as-
sumed that it was subject to personal jurisdiction in a state where it
was engaging in substantial business and where it was registered to do
business. The same is likely true for BNSF which, until Daimler, has
no basis to object to regularly being sued in Montana over non-Mon-
tana injuries because it was doing extensive business there. Similarly,
defendants in lawsuits like the one at issue in Bristol-Myers routinely
failed in the past to object to aggregations, even in plaintiff-friendly
jurisdictions because they had no basis to do so. The cause of these
new objections arises from the Court’s unprecedented division of per-
64. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120–21 (2014).
65. Id. at 123.
66. Id. at 134–36.
67. The Court probably should not have decided the constitutional personal jurisdiction issue
in Daimler because there were two clear non-constitutional grounds for dismissal: lack of statu-
tory subject matter jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. Before the Supreme Court decided
that case, all of the federal claims had been eliminated because of the recent substantive rulings
in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013), and Mohamad v. Palestinian Au-
thority, 566 U.S. 449 (2012). Daimler, 571 U.S. at 140–41. Furthermore, because the remaining
claims were only among aliens, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), was inapplicable. In
the alternative, because of a complete lack of connection between the claims and the California
forum, the case should have been dismissed on forum non-conveniens grounds. Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Similarly, in Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), none of the
courts needed to reach the personal jurisdiction-constitutional question, because the case plainly
should have been transferred to the Northern District of Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
(2012), where all witnesses except the plaintiffs were located and where all the events at issue
took place.
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sonal jurisdiction into two quite constricted departments and the sub-
stantial narrowing of general jurisdiction. Thus, Daimler rules out
general jurisdiction except in the defendant’s home states, and as
BNSF and Bristol-Myers show, that applies no matter how much of its
business the defendant did in the forum state.68 Given all of these suc-
cesses, there is no reason to think that the business community will
not continue to press its advantage and seek additional limits on the
choice of forums for plaintiffs.
Here are some ways in which plaintiffs’ choices may be further re-
duced. Under the approach adopted by the Court in Bristol-Myers,
there must be a direct relationship between the allegedly wrongful
conduct of the defendant and the injury to each plaintiff in the forum
in which the case is brought.69 Taken to its next step, as defendants
have been doing with each successive personal jurisdiction victory, the
company may argue that there would not be specific jurisdiction if, for
example, a plaintiff suing in State B had purchased Plavix from the
defendant in State A and later moved to State B, where plaintiff’s
symptoms first appeared and where the plaintiff now resides.70 In par-
ticular, if the plaintiff ingested most of the drug in State A, the defen-
dant would likely argue that suit must be brought there (or in
defendant’s home state). In that situation, the court might have to de-
termine how much Plavix was ingested in each state, over what period
of time, and what kind of symptoms first appeared in which jurisdic-
tion—all to resolve the preliminary question of where the case should
be litigated.71
Or suppose that the facts show that Plavix was sold throughout the
United States, but was designed and manufactured only in New
Jersey. Assume that plaintiffs base their claims on negligent design
and manufacture, which took place, if at all, in New Jersey. Would
that be the only state with specific jurisdiction over these claims be-
cause that is where the tortious conduct took place, even if none of
the plaintiffs had ever lived or ingested Plavix in New Jersey? Perhaps
defendants will not press their advantage to that extent, at least not
68. See supra notes 10–13 and accompanying text.
69. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781–82 (2017).
70. Defendants have already successfully made this argument in Waite v. All Acquisition
Corp., 901 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 2019 WL 400831 (U.S. Mar. 25, 2019) (No. 18-
998). In that case a Florida resident, who moved there after exposure to asbestos in Massachu-
setts, sued the asbestos manufacturer in Florida. Id. at 1311–12. Even though the manufacturer
had a plant and substantial operations in the state, the Eleventh Circuit found a lack of general
or specific personal jurisdiction over it. Id. at 1315, 1318.
71. See id. at 1315 (holding there was a lack of specific jurisdiction after a fact-intensive review
of plaintiff’s exposure, defendant’s operations in the forum, and their relation to one another).
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yet, but the defendant-protective rulings in BNSF and Bristol-Myers
would surely provide support for the conclusion that a company can
be sued only where its wrongful acts occurred.
Of perhaps more concern is the fact that many foreign manufactur-
ers, for legitimate reasons having nothing to do with personal jurisdic-
tion, establish wholly-owned U.S. subsidiaries through which all of
their sales are made in this country for products manufactured abroad.
Under the Court’s current approach, with the parent company not “at
home” anywhere in the United States, and with the claim based on
defective designs or manufacturing done abroad by the parent, the
parent may not be able to be sued anywhere in this country even for
injuries sustained here.72 Moreover, even if the plaintiff has a valid
legal claim against a non-manufacturing subsidiary located in the
United States, over which it can obtain personal jurisdiction some-
place in the United States, discovery on the merits will be needed
against the foreign parent company, which will be very complicated, if
it can be done at all.
There is yet another complication that may make personal jurisdic-
tion even more problematic in many of these cases. As the records in
World-Wide Volkswagen and Daimler show, even the U.S. subsidiary
does not sell automobiles to consumers: They are sold through truly
independent dealers. Following McIntyre, the manufacturer and its
subsidiary may be able to avoid being sued where the plaintiff was
injured, even if it is in the state where she bought the automobile that
injured her, because her only contact was with the local independent
dealer. This possibility was also supported by the arguments made by
Bristol-Myers and its amici, as well as some of the amici in Daimler.73
Moreover, although the defendants that allegedly injured the plaintiffs
in McIntyre, Goodyear, and Daimler were foreign corporations, the
principles that the Court enunciated appear to apply equally to com-
panies incorporated in the United States.74 If the Court follows
through on this approach to general and specific jurisdiction, it will
have created a mechanism for major U.S. manufacturers of potentially
dangerous products to insulate themselves from suits in state courts if
their products are sold through independent third parties, except per-
haps if the sales are made in their home states.
72. See Wilson v. Nouvag GmbH, No. 15-CV-11700, 2018 WL 1565602, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
30, 2018) (holding that a foreign manufacturer cannot be sued in Illinois, where its distributor is
based, for injuries to a Virginia plaintiff).
73. Bristol-Myers, 137 U.S. 1773, 1788 n.3 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Daimler, 571
U.S. 117, 136 n.16 (2014).
74. See J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd., v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011).
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Even before the Court decided Bristol-Myers, the invitations from
McIntyre, Goodyear, and Daimler to constrict personal jurisdiction
had been accepted by the Supreme Court of Alabama in what may
well be a preview of future decisions. In what can hardly be called a
unique set of circumstances, a wholly-owned Canadian subsidiary of
General Motors manufactured and sold a car to GM US, which then
sold it through an independent dealer to a buyer in Pennsylvania who
eventually drove the car to Alabama. The car was in an accident in
Alabama, and a passenger was seriously injured, allegedly due to a
defect in the car’s design, manufacture, or both.75 Suit was brought
against the Pennsylvania dealer who, like the dealer in World-Wide
Volkswagen, was dismissed from the case and, eventually, so was GM
Canada on the ground that there was no connection between GM Ca-
nada, this car, and Alabama.76
Again, the holding itself—that a foreign company cannot be sued in
a state in which it did no business directly, nor sold the product in
question—is not so troubling. The issues of future significance are
where, if at all in the United States, the plaintiff could sue companies
in the position of GM Canada, and where GM US could be sued on
this claim, if at all.77 Or would the only possible defendant over whom
there would be personal jurisdiction anywhere be the Pennsylvania
dealer and then only in that state? If that were the situation, it is un-
clear whether the car dealer would have any substantive liability for a
claim of a design or manufacturing defect. In any event, the dealer
would attempt to implead GM US, from which it bought the car (un-
less there was a further intermediary), but that would still leave the
Alabama plaintiff with no right to sue anyone close to where he was
injured. Until Goodyear and Daimler, major multi-national companies
like GM US, GM Canada, and Volkswagen would never have con-
tested personal jurisdiction over a claim that one of its products was
defectively made and injured someone in the forum state, and surely
would not have argued that they could only be sued where they were
safe at home.78
75. Hinrichs v. Gen. Motors of Canada, Ltd., 222 So.3d 1114, 1116–17 (Ala. 2016), cert. de-
nied, 137 S. Ct. 2291 (2017).
76. Id. at 1141.
77. The liability of GM US was not litigated because, after plaintiff filed suit, GM had been
reorganized so that any liability it had to plaintiff was arguably discharged. Nonetheless, the new
reorganized GM settled with plaintiff. Id. at 1117.
78. GM Canada involved a claim against the manufacturer of a finished product, not a maker
of a component, as in Asahi, where precluding suit against a component maker would still enable
suit to be brought against the final product maker, which would then have to sue the component
maker where there would be jurisdiction between those two companies.
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If the Due Process Clause or some other part of the Constitution
contained the words “general” and “specific” to modify personal juris-
diction, or if the Court had used that method of adjudicating constitu-
tional defenses to assertions of personal jurisdiction from the outset,
the Court might be justified in retaining them. But neither is true, and
in fact, the terms first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion as two
footnotes in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,79
which cited only law review articles as their authority. Moreover, the
stringent limits on general jurisdiction embodied in the “at home” ap-
proach only date back to 2011 in Goodyear. If the current rigid dichot-
omy between special and general jurisdiction used in determining
whether personal jurisdiction over a business defendant is retained,
the implications for the specific jurisdiction cases that will flow from
those rulings further demonstrate why the Due Process Clause is the
wrong basis on which to decide these questions.
D. The Final Straw
The event that finally pushed me to write this Article was grading
the final exams in my civil procedure class for the fall semester of
2016. As I always do, I had a personal jurisdiction question, which is
appended to this Article. These are the essential facts: A university in
one state solicited money from a famous scientist from a distant state,
who had no prior connection with the university. He was asked to
donate to a new science center, a part of which would bear his name.
Without actually visiting the university, he agreed to make contribu-
tions over several years. Shortly after making the initial payment, he
learned facts which, he alleges, would have caused him not to make
the pledge and, he alleges, that the university knowingly withheld this
information from him, thereby defrauding him. Both the donor and
the university sued in their home states. My students were asked to
assess the personal jurisdiction defenses raised by each party to the
other’s complaint.
My practice is to sketch out the answer to my questions before the
exams are given, but there are always surprises. This time, I antici-
pated how the class would react to the question, but what I did not
fully appreciate until I was in the middle of grading was that the “pur-
poseful availment” concept, as applied to these specific jurisdiction
questions, was virtually meaningless. Yes, there were facts to which
each side could point, but they were trivial at best and did not come
close to providing an answer, let alone a coherent one that could be
79. 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984).
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justified to my students. I also realized that this problem did not in-
volve Internet-based transactions, which would only put further stress
on “purposeful availment.” It was time for me to say that “the Em-
peror has no clothes,” which is this part of this Article, and then to
find a new tailor, which is the next.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE COURT ASSERTIONS OF
PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS SHOULD BE DECIDED UNDER
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
In light of cases like Goodyear and Daimler, where the lower courts
found personal jurisdiction, but the facts underlying the claim had no
connection with the forum, there is still a need to provide some judi-
cial protection for defendants against expansive forum shopping. De-
spite all its flaws, abandoning the Due Process Clause in personal
jurisdiction cases would be unacceptable if there were no alternative
that would provide some limits on state court assertions of the right to
entertain a suit against a non-resident. In my view, the approach de-
veloped under the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prevents states
from imposing unreasonable burdens on interstate and foreign com-
merce, is the best option. But before turning to it, I address the possi-
ble use of the Full Faith and Credit Clause as an alternative.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV requires, inter alia,
that states give effect to the judgments of their sister states and also
empowers Congress to make laws prescribing how they shall be
proven “and the effects thereof.”80 As my colleague Roger Trangsrud
demonstrated nearly three decades ago, the clause requires recogni-
tion of only those out-of-state judgments that are legally binding
outside the rendering state, which assumes that the original court must
have had personal jurisdiction over the person against whom the judg-
ment was entered.81 He also concludes, and I agree, that Congress has
the authority to write rules by which the enforceability of state court
judgments must be determined.82 And Congress has enacted a gen-
eral, but limited, provision on recognizing judgments83 as well as laws
specifically applicable to child custody determinations84 and child sup-
80. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
81. Trangsrud, supra note 25, at 864–65.
82. Id. at 903–05.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
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port orders.85 Thus, if Congress acted to issue general rules for per-
sonal jurisdiction in state courts, it would solve the problem. It is quite
doubtful that Congress will be any more successful than the Court has
been in trying to prescribe detailed rules in this area. But the larger
point is that Congress has not done so, and therefore another back-
stop is needed.
Professor Trangsrud proposed that a standard of “political consent”
by the defendant be used until Congress steps in and that the standard
should replace the substantive due process approach now used by the
Court.86 As I understand that concept, which is drawn from the notion
that the authority of the state generally is based on the consent of the
governed, it is that personal jurisdiction should arise only by consent
of the defendant, including implied consent. My difficulty with that
alternative is that it is almost as open-ended as the current due pro-
cess approach embodied in what appears to have become the magic
words “purposeful availment.” To be fair to Professor Trangsrud, his
1989 article was written before both the line of cases that have led to
the current understanding of the due process approach and the advent
of the Internet. Nonetheless, at least as it is currently proposed, the
concept of political consent does not provide any meaningful and sen-
sible guidelines, which is the main problem with the Court’s Due Pro-
cess approach and which is why I suggest the Dormant Commerce
Clause as a preferable alternative.87
Turning to the Dormant Commerce Clause, although subjecting a
business to suit in the courts of a state in which it is not regularly
doing business is not generally described as the state attempting to
“regulate” the conduct of that business, that is the impact of a judg-
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (2012 & Supp. V 2018). It also enacted a provision that permitted states
not to recognize same sex marriages performed out-of-state, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012), but which
no longer has any effect after the Supreme Court held that laws banning same sex marriages
were unconstitutional. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
86. Trangsrud, supra note 25, at 884. For other commentators who agree that the rule is sub-
stantive, not procedural, see Peterson, supra note 18, at 114 n.66.
87. Another area in which the Court has restricted the powers of state courts is choice of law,
again through the substantive limits in the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The Court there concluded that a Kansas state court could not
automatically apply the law of Kansas to determine the proper interest rate payable on royalties
for oil leases where “over 99% of the gas leases and some 97% of the plaintiffs in the case had
no apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for this lawsuit.” Id. at 815. The principal
problem there was that the Kansas courts made no effort to determine whether there were ac-
tual conflicts with the laws of other states that had connections with these transactions. Id. at
816. The Supreme Court also made clear that states had wide latitude in this area of law, id. at
823, and since that decision, the Court has not rejected a state court’s choice of law ruling. For
these reasons, relying on choice of law decisions would not solve the personal jurisdiction
problem.
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ment against an out-of-state defendant in a lawsuit: The state is effec-
tively ordering the defendant to conduct its business in a certain
manner or, as in most tort cases, to pay damages for failing to have
done so.88 Thus, because California could have constitutionally regu-
lated Bristol-Myers’s sale of Plavix in California, there should have
been no Commerce Clause barrier to a California court entering a tort
judgment against Bristol-Myers. As I show below, under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, a California court could enter a judgment having
that regulatory effect, regardless of whether a particular plaintiff
bought or used Plavix in California (as was the case for 86 plaintiffs)
or elsewhere (as was the case for the remaining 592 plaintiffs).
The idea that the Dormant Commerce Clause is relevant to the is-
sue of personal jurisdiction is hardly a new concept. Indeed, prior to
International Shoe, defendants that objected to state courts entertain-
ing suits against them relied principally on claims of undue burden
under the Dormant Commerce Clause.89 For example, in Denver &
Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Terte, one defendant railroad,
which had operations in the forum state, was permitted to be sued
there, but the other railroad, which had no such forum state opera-
tions, was dismissed.90 Although the Due Process Clause was men-
tioned in Terte, the Court resolved the issue of personal jurisdiction
under the Dormant Commerce Clause by assessing the burdens on
each defendant.
Similarly, in International Shoe itself, the Dormant Commerce
Clause was part of the basis of the company’s objection, to which the
Court responded as follows:
Appellant’s argument, renewed here, that the [taxing] statute im-
poses an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce need not
detain us. . . . 26 U.S.C. § 1606(a) . . . provides that “No person
required under a State law to make payments to an unemployment
fund shall be relieved from compliance therewith on the ground
that he is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, or that the
State law does not distinguish between employees engaged in inter-
state or foreign commerce and those engaged in intrastate com-
merce.” It is no longer debatable that Congress, in the exercise of
88. See Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466), 2017 WL 1046237 (recogniz-
ing the regulatory impact of state court adjudications).
89. See Denver & Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284, 285, 287 (1932) (collecting
cases).
90. Id. at 287.
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the commerce power, may authorize the states, in specified ways, to
regulate interstate commerce or impose burdens upon it.91
The statute in the quoted passage refers to the state law imposing sub-
stantive liability for unemployment taxes on International Shoe. Hav-
ing found that the state had the power to assess unemployment taxes
against International Shoe under the Dormant Commerce Clause,92 it
is almost inconceivable that the Constitution would not permit Wash-
ington to collect that tax in its own courts, rather than having to sue
the taxpayer in its home state courts. Therefore, by that reasoning, if
there is no Dormant Commerce Clause objection to a state statute
imposing substantive liability on an out-of-state defendant, there can
be no Dormant Commerce Clause objection to suing the defendant in
that state. Indeed, International Shoe argued that the State had a
heavier burden to support the tax than it did to commence the pro-
ceeding to collect the tax.93
The proper relation between the Due Process Clause and the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause can be seen in two cases involving collection
of use taxes. In those cases, states sought to impose on out-of-state
mail-order businesses the obligation to collect the state use tax that is
payable by the in-state purchaser for goods sent from out-of-state. In
both cases, National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue94 and
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,95 it was agreed that neither the state
from which the products were shipped, nor the state into which they
were sent, could constitutionally collect a sales tax on the product. It
was also agreed that the state into which the product was sent may
collect a use tax from the purchaser in an amount equal to the sales
tax that the state would have collected if the sale had been made by an
in-state merchant. The question presented in both cases was whether
the state seeking to collect the use tax could require the out-of-state
seller to collect that tax for it, consistent with both the Due Process
and the Dormant Commerce Clauses.
In National Bellas Hess, the Court discussed the relationship be-
tween the two Clauses as follows:
National argues that the liabilities which Illinois has thus imposed
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and
91. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 315 (1945). The current version of section
1606(a) is in 26 U.S.C. § 3305(a) (2012).
92. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 321.
93. Appellant’s Reply Brief at 6, Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (No. 107), 1945 WL 48613, at
*6.
94. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
95. 504 U.S. 298 (1992), overruled by South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
For a further discussion, see infra note 106.
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create an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce. These
two claims are closely related. For the test whether a particular state
exaction is such as to invade the exclusive authority of Congress to
regulate trade between the States, and the test for a State’s compli-
ance with the requirements of due process in this area are similar.96
The Court then agreed that the state could not constitutionally impose
such a requirement, but it did so without differentiating between the
two grounds.97 Although the Court did not use the words “procedu-
ral” or “substantive” to characterize the Due Process defense, the
context makes it quite clear that the constitutional flaw was not proce-
dural because the company made no complaint about a lack of notice
or opportunity to contest the tax.98 It simply argued that the state had
no power to coerce it into collecting the tax, the precise kind of claim
made in the Due Process personal jurisdiction cases discussed in Sec-
tion I. The three dissenting Justices disagreed with the majority on
whether the state tax collection law imposed a substantial burden on
interstate commerce. Although the dissent did not separately address
the Due Process claim, the language that it used to determine the law-
fulness of the burden is reminiscent of language from personal juris-
diction decisions.99 Yet nothing in the majority opinion suggests that a
purchaser who was unhappy with the quality of National’s products,
or was injured by them, could not sue the company in the courts of
Illinois to recover the sales price or the damages for any resulting
harm.
The same two objections to collecting a use tax were made twenty-
five years later in Quill, with the same result, but this time only on
Dormant Commerce Clause grounds.100 In describing its prior deci-
sion on this issue, the majority observed that it ruled against the state
in that case because the out-of-state seller “lacked the requisite mini-
mum contacts with the State,”101 which were the very terms used in
International Shoe102 but not satisfied in National Bellas Hess. The ma-
jority then disagreed with the conclusion in National Bellas Hess that
96. Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 756.
97. Id. at 758.
98. Id. at 756.
99. Id. at 765 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“As the [majority] says, the test whether an out-of-state
business must comply with a state levy is variously formulated: ‘whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return’; whether the out-of-state business enjoys the protection or
benefits of the State; whether there is a sufficient nexus: ‘Some definite link, some minimum
connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.’” (footnotes
omitted)).
100. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. at 318.
101. Id. at 301.
102. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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the two Clauses completely overlapped, in part because it noted that
Congress can cure a Dormant Commerce Clause violation but cannot
fix the problem if there is a Due Process objection—at least when the
issue is the power of the state to require an out-of-state person to
comply with its laws.103 It then went on to overrule the Due Process
basis for striking down the law at issue in National Bellas Hess.104 It
nonetheless declined to overrule National Bellas Hess on Dormant
Commerce Clause grounds, in part for reasons of stare decisis and in
part because Congress was now able to deal with any problems that
the decision had created once the Due Process barrier was re-
moved.105 Thus, Quill establishes that a state law can be consistent
with Due Process but at the same time can violate the Dormant Com-
merce Clause.106 That is because the inquiries are related but
separate.
The validity of a state law like that in Quill requiring the collection
of taxes owed by others is, to be sure, different from the question of
whether a state may require an out-of-state defendant to respond to a
claim filed in its courts. Nonetheless, there are several sets of reasons
why the answers to both questions can and should be determined by
application of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and not
under the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause on which the
Supreme Court has traditionally relied. First, as demonstrated in Sec-
tion I, the Due Process personal jurisdiction doctrine is without basis
in the Constitution, and it has produced (1) decisions that are difficult
to apply, (2) results that are difficult to justify in light of the stated
purposes of the limits on personal jurisdiction, and (3) the need for
extensive discovery on the threshold issue of whether there is specific
jurisdiction, which will be required in all but the most routine cases.
Second, as I now demonstrate, the Dormant Commerce Clause is a
proper constitutional fit, it is relatively easy to apply, it produces sen-
sible results in personal jurisdiction cases, and it generally will require
little or no discovery to resolve.107
103. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 305.
104. Id. at 308 (relying in part on Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, and Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 462 (1985)).
105. Id. at 318; see also id. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. As discussed supra note 95, the holding in Quill was overruled by the Court in South
Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018). That overruling does not undermine the
arguments made in this Article, and, as explained below, the Court’s rationale provides further
support for the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to issues of personal jurisdiction.
107. For a recent case in which there was limited initial personal jurisdiction discovery, fol-
lowed by an interlocutory appeal, and a denial of certiorari, with more discovery to follow, see
Align Corp. v. Boustred, 421 P.3d 163, 166 (Colo. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2623 (2018).
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It is also significant that application of the Dormant Commerce
Clause is consistent with the stated principles underlying the Court’s
Due Process rulings. Although the decisions in cases such as Good-
year, Daimler, World-Wide Volkswagen, and McIntyre focus on the
extent of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, each of the
opinions makes clear that the Court’s underlying concerns are with
the potential adverse impact of upholding personal jurisdiction on the
ability of the defendant to engage in foreign or interstate commerce.
That concern is at the heart of this Court’s Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, which, unlike the Due Process approach to per-
sonal jurisdiction, is derived from the principles underlying the Com-
merce Clause itself. Within the strands of Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, the proper test to determine whether a forum state can
exercise jurisdiction over a particular defendant is that in Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc.:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question be-
comes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.108
Accordingly, to demonstrate that this approach is doctrinally sound,
produces fair results, and can be utilized with a minimal amount of
discovery, I will apply it to the Supreme Court’s most recent signifi-
cant personal jurisdiction cases, whether falling under general or spe-
cific jurisdiction.109
In World-Wide Volkswagen, there were four defendants, but for
simplicity, focusing on the manufacturer and the dealer will illustrate
how the Dormant Commerce Clause can properly and fairly resolve
the personal jurisdiction question for both of them and for the plain-
tiffs. The question to be asked upfront is whether Oklahoma (where
the accident occurred) could constitutionally regulate the conduct that
was the basis of the claim in that case, for example, by passing a law
applicable to automobiles operating in the state with certain design or
108. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (internal citation omitted).
109. States may also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-
state businesses, often by enacting laws that literally or practically apply only to out-of-state
businesses. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626–27 (1978). Because personal
jurisdiction statutes and rules are written in neutral terms, the anti-discrimination cases do not
apply here.
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manufacturing defects, regardless of where the car was manufactured
or purchased. Under that law, and assuming no federal preemption,
the state could seek monetary penalties or a court order directing the
recall or repair of non-conforming vehicles. Based on Pike, that law
would not create an excessive burden on foreign commerce, as long as
the covered defects were similar to those imposed on the manufac-
turer in other jurisdictions in which its products were sold. In that situ-
ation, a suit to collect those penalties, or to obtain an injunction, could
be brought against the manufacturer in the Oklahoma courts without
violating the Dormant Commerce Clause.110
However, if Oklahoma sought to apply that law to the New York
auto dealer who sold the car to the person driving it in Oklahoma,
that would impose very significant burdens on the dealer, who did not
design or manufacture the car. Thus, in order to comply with that law,
the dealer would have to, in effect, re-make and re-design every vehi-
cle that it sold to satisfy every state no matter where the vehicle might
be driven. Under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, that burden
would be clearly excessive, and the law could not be enforced against
an out-of-state dealer. Returning to the personal jurisdiction issue,
and applying the Pike Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the state
court would not have personal jurisdiction over tort or other claims
against the dealer, but it would against the car’s manufacturer because
the manufacturer intended to have its vehicles sold and driven any-
where in the United States. And, unlike under the McIntyre approach,
there would appear to be little or no need for discovery as to the ex-
tent of their activities in Oklahoma in order to decide the motions to
dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction by either the dealer or the
manufacturer.
In Burger King v. Rudzewicz,111 the out-of-state defendant was re-
quired to litigate a claim involving a contract that it signed with a Flor-
ida franchisor. To test the Dormant Commerce Clause approach,
suppose that Florida passed a law imposing modest monetary penal-
ties on all parties to a franchise agreement if they failed to comply
110. The brief of the United States in Bristol-Myers correctly observed that Plavix as well as
many other consumer products, are subject to federal rules that preempt different state laws.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 24–25 n.3, Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017) (No. 16-466), 2017 WL 1046237. That obser-
vation was not a reason to deny California’s assertion of personal jurisdiction there, but one to
permit it, because, if there is an existing federal standard, there is no possibility that California
could apply a different substantive standard than would apply elsewhere. And the fact that an
existing federal standard preempts state law does not establish that, absent the federal law, state
law would run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
111. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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with its material terms without good cause. Under Pike, that law
would not create any special burdens on out-of-state businesses that it
did not impose on local businesses, and so it would not be subject to a
Dormant Commerce Clause objection. In such a case, the out-of-state
party would have to defend the claim in the Florida courts, just as the
defendant did in the actual Burger King case. And the same would be
true if Burger King had been sued in Michigan, and it objected to
personal jurisdiction there.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court112 is another personal
jurisdiction case that could have been readily resolved in a sensible
and fair manner under Pike with much less difficulty than in the actual
case, in which there was no majority opinion. The objecting party
there was the maker of valves used in tubes for motorcycle tires. It
was located in Taiwan and had sold its valves to a Japanese tube mak-
ing company which in turn had sold them to the tire maker, which in
turn had sold the tires that were the alleged cause of the plaintiff’s
injuries.113 The Due Process question in Asahi was whether the tube
maker could continue with its cross-claims against the valve maker in
the California state courts after all other claims and cross claims had
settled.114 Under Pike, the question would be whether, under a hypo-
thetical California law, the state could dictate the standards which the
Taiwanese valve maker had to follow for valves for motorcycle tires
used in California and could the State subject the valve maker to mon-
etary penalties or an injunction for failing to do so. The answer would
surely be that the burden on that Taiwanese company to follow Cali-
fornia law would be clearly excessive, although perhaps a different
answer might be given if the valve maker was a U.S. company whose
products were sold to tube and tire makers throughout this country.
Under the Pike approach, if that substantive burden could not be im-
posed under the Dormant Commerce Clause (regardless of whether
the defendant is a domestic or foreign business), then the valve maker
could not be sued on the basis of that obligation, even if the claim
arose in tort instead of in a penalty enforcement case.
On the other hand, if McIntyre were viewed through a Pike lens, the
result would almost certainly have been different. Thus, if New Jersey
established substantive safety standards for shearing machines that
were not preempted by federal law, McIntyre could not have objected
to complying with them for its machines that ended up in New Jersey.
That would be true whether it sold the machine directly or through a
112. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
113. Id. at 105–06.
114. Id.
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subsidiary or an independent distributor. Either way, any burdens
would not be excessive in light of New Jersey’s interests in protecting
its citizens against all dangerous machines no matter where they were
manufactured or how they arrived in the state. And if McIntyre UK
had no Dormant Commerce Clause objection to the substantive stan-
dard, it could be sued in New Jersey state courts if it failed to comply
with New Jersey’s substantive standards and that failure caused the
injury to the plaintiff.
Goodyear and Daimler would have reached the same result under
Pike as under the Due Process Clause, albeit by a different and much
more direct route. Surely, North Carolina could not dictate the safety
standards for foreign manufacturers for their tires that were not man-
ufactured, sold, or even used in North Carolina.115 Nor could Califor-
nia dictate to the employees of an Argentine subsidiary of Daimler
what they may and may not do in Argentina in the conduct of the
company’s business there no matter how offensive California may find
their conduct. Neither case would require discovery, and a motion to
dismiss might not even have to be made because the excessiveness of
the burdens that the state would have imposed on foreign companies
would be obvious to all. And there would be no need to undergo ex-
tensive discovery as would be the case if general and specific jurisdic-
tion and Due Process were at issue.
Of course, invoking the Dormant Commerce Clause will not auto-
matically answer all personal jurisdiction cases involving a commercial
defendant because there are still disputes about how to apply the
Clause even if it is clear that it supplies the applicable rule of law. But,
compared to the difficulties that the Supreme Court, many other
courts, law professors, and law students have with the current Due
Process jurisprudence, using the Dormant Commerce Clause would
be a vast improvement.116
The superiority of a Dormant Commerce Clause approach to that
of a Due Process focus on contacts and purposeful availment can be
seen from the facts of a recent state tax case, which could easily be
present in a personal jurisdiction context. In Florida Department of
Revenue v. American Business USA Corp., an online flower business
115. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 921 (2011).
116. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277 (2014), did not involve a commercial defendant, but a
government agent sued in federal court for refusal to return property to the plaintiff in the
forum state when the property had been seized in another State. Had the case been in state
court, such that transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) was not available, the Court could
have used the Pike analysis to properly conclude that the forum state had no authority to regu-
late what happened in the state where the seizure took place, which would include the failure to
minimize the harm to the plaintiff by promptly returning the seized property.
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fulfilled its orders through independent flower shops, which were lo-
cated in various states, as were the persons who purchased the flowers
and the individuals to whom they were sent.117 In many cases, the pur-
chaser and the recipient will not know which flower shop actually did
the delivery, nor will they know the location of the online company
(or its website operators). Similarly, the online company may know
the name of the purchaser, but have no idea where that person lives or
where the person was when the order was placed, especially if the
transaction was made via credit card. The issue in the actual case was
whether the Dormant Commerce Clause precluded Florida from im-
posing a sales tax on flowers delivered out of state, and the Florida
court upheld the tax.118
Now suppose that instead of a tax dispute, the disputes were over
any of the following: (1) the quality of the flowers, (2) whether the
flowers contained insects that infected the house of the recipient, and
(3) the non-payment by the purchaser of the amount due. In those
situations, asking whether any of the potential defendants “purpose-
fully availed” themselves of any of the fora where they might be sued
is a quest bound to fail because that question is meaningless and ill-
suited for the inquiry. On the other hand, using the Dormant Com-
merce Clause would lead to the conclusion that there would be no
barrier, i.e., no excessive burden, if the online seller were sued in the
state court of the purchaser or recipient or if the non-paying purchaser
were sued where the online seller is located. And in answering those
questions, the existing lines between general and specific jurisdiction
would become irrelevant, and the issue of personal jurisdiction could
be resolved without the kind of extensive factual discovery that McIn-
tyre seems to compel plaintiffs to undertake.
Examining the facts of Bristol-Myers through Pike’s Dormant Com-
merce Clause lens produces a clear but different picture. The com-
pany did not dispute that it could be sued in California for Plavix
purchased and used there, even though it did not make the sale di-
rectly to those consumers and the drug was not manufactured there. It
presumably made that concession because it directed a significant por-
tion of its efforts to sell Plavix to California residents—purposefully
availing itself of the laws of California—and thus could be sued there
by them, even after McIntyre. In addition, the parties agreed, at least
for personal jurisdiction purposes, that the substantive standard that
California will apply to determine whether defendant’s drugs are de-
117. 191 So. 3d 906, 908 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017).
118. Id. at 911.
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fective is the same for both the resident and non-resident plaintiffs.
Therefore, defendant’s obligations to design, label, and manufacture
Plavix did not vary depending on where the drug was sold or con-
sumed. Moreover, the company did not argue that the existence of
intermediaries who actually sold Plavix to consumers altered its legal
obligations because it had exclusive control over the alleged causes of
the drug being defective. The company nonetheless objected to being
sued in California by persons who consumed the drug elsewhere.
Bristol-Myers admitted, indeed embraced, the fact that it can be
sued in other states where the non-California plaintiffs ingested
Plavix. Thus, the question under Pike would be whether forcing the
company to defend against the 592 non-California plaintiffs in Califor-
nia, instead of in the many other states where it would be sued, is an
unconstitutional burden on commerce. Because Bristol-Myers would
have to defend against 86 claims in California and therefore be subject
to significant discovery and probably several trials there, it is hard to
understand how the burden of responding to the remaining claims
there, rather than in other fora, can be considered excessive, let alone
“clearly excessive” as Pike requires.
But if the determination of excessive burden depended in part on
the state’s reasons for supporting the consolidation of these claims in
its courts, two are apparent. First, and most prominent, is the desire to
help California residents in their cases by enabling them to join forces
with plaintiffs from other states who will also be benefitted by the
consolidation of these claims, which would create greater efficiency in
discovery and in the briefing of the legal and factual issues that must
be decided. The majority in Bristol-Myers recognized the value of con-
solidation but noted that there could still be meaningful consolidation
in states like Texas and Ohio, where many of the non-residents in the
California case resided, as well as in the home jurisdictions of the de-
fendant, where some cases had already been filed.119 In other words,
the case was all about forum shopping, and the Court relied on the
Due Process Clause to rule for the defendant, instead of the more
appropriate Dormant Commerce Clause which would have supported
the plaintiffs.
Second, allowing consolidation of cases in a single state, as Califor-
nia attempted there, may eliminate the need for satellite litigation
elsewhere over where injured consumers may sue. For example, given
the Bristol-Myers Court’s narrow view of where injured plaintiffs can
sue, a consumer who lived in one state when Plavix was first pre-
119. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783 (2017).
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scribed, and moved to another during the course of the treatment,
may be met with personal jurisdiction objections that only serve to
delay the case and impose burdens on the plaintiff and on the courts
unrelated to the merits of the controversy. To the extent that the
state’s reasons for allowing consolidation are relevant in a Pike ap-
proach, these would more than suffice, and hence the outcome would
have been the opposite of what the Court held.
Moreover, the Court’s ruling in favor of Bristol-Myers could make
it impossible to bring nationwide class action suits for economic dam-
ages, even those that meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23.120 Bristol-Myers did not acknowledge this potential im-
pact of its position, and the Court declined to decide the question.121
But the victory for Bristol-Myers is likely to re-open the jurisdictional
dispute in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.122 The merits issue there
was whether the class was owed interest on royalty payments that had
been improperly delayed by the defendant, and if so, at what rate. The
Court upheld a nationwide state court class action against a personal
jurisdiction argument made by the defendant, although it overturned,
on Due Process grounds, the decision to apply the law of the forum
state to the merits of the dispute.123
On the personal jurisdiction issue, Shutts involved claims by 28,000
owners of royalty leases from Phillips Petroleum Company, a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in Oklahoma, on
properties located in eleven states.124 The case was brought by a single
Kansas resident in Kansas state court, which applied Kansas substan-
tive law, despite the fact that “over 99% of the gas leases and some
97% of the plaintiffs in the case had no apparent connection to the
State of Kansas except for this lawsuit.”125 The company objected to
the nationwide class not on the ground that the state court lacked ju-
risdiction over it, as in Bristol-Meyers, but on the ground that the Due
Process rights of absent class members were violated by causing their
claims (worth about $100 each) to be adjudicated in a state court with
which they had no connection, unless they affirmatively consented to
120. Courts grappling with this question have come to opposite conclusions. See Alison Fran-
kel, Courts Are Starting to Decide If BMS Jurisdiction Precedent Applies in Class Actions,
REUTERS (Oct. 26. 2017), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document/I5d8fd020ba9c11e794b1e51a4cb
22ae7/ View/FullText.html.
121. Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
122. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
123. Id. at 799.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 815.
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jurisdiction there.126 The Court unanimously rejected that argument,
finding that other protections, including notice, the right to opt out,
and court supervision of the class action, provided all the process that
was due to the class.127
After Bristol-Myers, because a defendant like the one in Shutts
would have had little or no connection with the forum for the claims
of most of the class, it would surely argue that an otherwise proper
nationwide class action could not be maintained against it, even if the
Due Process rights of all class members were protected. To be sure,
like in Bristol-Myers, the case could have been brought in Oklahoma,
the company’s headquarters. But suppose a class action had been
brought in states such as Texas, Louisiana, Wyoming, or New Mexico
where there were significant numbers of leaseholders, properties, or
royalties due on those properties.128 Indeed, unlike Bristol-Myers
where the company admitted that the substantive law would be the
same for all plaintiffs, no matter where they resided, in Shutts there
was at least a genuine dispute about the applicable interest rate, as-
suming that the defendant was liable for the unpaid interest at
whatever rate was proper.129
As a matter of class action law under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 or its state court equivalents, the fact that only some leases
might require interest to be paid, or that interest rates might vary
among the leases could be dealt with by sub-classes, assuming the
other Rule 23 requirements were met. But after Bristol-Myers, Phillips
Petroleum’s objection would be that it could not be sued on behalf of
the class in any state besides Oklahoma or Delaware. In Oklahoma,
there were many, but at most a significant minority, of the leases, or
the royalty owners, or both. In Delaware, Phillip Petroleum’s state of
incorporation, there were no leases and no member of the plaintiff
class resided there.130 Perhaps a few states would have enough of a
connection with the plaintiffs, their leases, or both to have viable class
actions, but the only one where all the claims could be brought was
the jurisdiction in which the defendant would most like to be—its
home sweet home in Oklahoma.
By contrast, under a Pike approach, the Shutts plaintiffs could sue in
their preferred forum if the state had the power, consistent with the
Dormant Commerce Clause, to enact the substantive law at issue
126. Id. at 806.
127. Id. at 811–14.
128. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 815 n.6.
129. Id. at 816–18.
130. See discussion supra note 87.
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there, which protected the owners of the lease payments from the
company’s refusal to pay them interest on money admittedly owed. A
state could properly exercise that authority where there were a signifi-
cant number of leases in the state, where the dollar amounts owed on
the leases were large, or where the company had solicited a large
number of local residents to invest in the lease. Given these three rea-
sonable ways for a state to exercise jurisdiction, there would be a far
greater likelihood that one or perhaps two states other than
Oklahoma could hear these class actions.131
The same analysis would produce a more evenly balanced result for
the plaintiff in BNSF who was injured while working on the defen-
dant’s railroad in Washington and who sued in Montana. So far as the
record reveals, the accident was the kind that railroad employees
often sustain, regardless of where they are working on a given day.
Thus, it was as likely that a worker could have suffered that injury in
Montana, where BNSF had substantial regular operations, as where it
actually happened. Assuming no federal preemption as to the specific
conduct at issue, Montana could properly have sought to regulate the
kind of activity that caused the plaintiff’s injuries without offending
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Therefore, using the Dormant Com-
merce Clause approach, there would be no basis for objecting to the
suit being brought in Montana or, for that matter, in the plaintiff’s
home state of South Dakota even though the decision in BNSF pre-
cluded suit in those jurisdictions because the injury did not take place
in the state where the plaintiff sued.
But suppose that the injury to the railroad employee in BNSF re-
sulted from a condition in the railroad yards that was unique to
BNSF’s operations in Washington. If suit was brought in a state other
than where the accident occurred or the defendant’s home state, the
Dormant Commerce Clause would not allow that suit because the fo-
rum state would not be entitled to impose burdens as to a condition
not found in the forum jurisdiction. Similarly, if a California resident
slipped on a wet floor in a Bristol-Myers’s property in New York, a
California court should not be able to adjudicate that matter because
California has no legitimate regulatory interest in preventing slip and
fall accidents outside its territory.
131. Shutts is an example of the kind of multi-state case which ought to be within the ambit of
the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2012), and be decided in federal court, ex-
cept that the defendant is now likely to move to dismiss on personal jurisdiction grounds, either
in state court or after removal to federal court. At least with respect to cases like Shutts, in which
the claims involved interstate commerce, Congress almost certainly could authorize class actions
like that to be heard in federal court.
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This past June, in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.,132 the Supreme
Court overruled the Dormant Commerce Clause holding in Quill, re-
jecting what the Court called “the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinc-
tion that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause precedents
disavow.”133 Further, in language that also supports application of the
Dormant Commerce Clause to business-related personal jurisdiction
questions, the Court noted that:
The reasons given in Quill for rejecting the physical presence rule
for due process purposes apply as well to the question whether
physical presence is a requisite for an out-of-state seller’s liability to
remit sales taxes. Physical presence is not necessary to create a sub-
stantial nexus.134
As the Court further observed in language that applies with similar
effect to the ability of interstate businesses to defend lawsuits where
they do business, “the administrative costs of compliance, especially in
the modern economy with its Internet technology, are largely unre-
lated to whether a company happens to have a physical presence in a
State.”135 Instead of the physical presence rule, the Court recognized
that the balancing approach in Pike would remain available in the
event that states imposed unreasonable burdens on out-of-state
sellers.136
Wayfair is not, of course, a personal jurisdiction case, and neither it
nor any other Dormant Commerce Clause case post-International
Shoe holds that the Due Process Clause is not the proper basis to de-
cide personal jurisdiction cases and that it should be replaced by a
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. But, as the Court noted in
Wayfair, examining personal jurisdiction under the jurisprudence of
the latter clause would avoid “the sort of arbitrary, formalistic distinc-
tion[s]” found in the Court’s most recent personal jurisdiction
rulings.137
There is one final reason why a Dormant Commerce Clause ap-
proach is preferable to one relying on Due Process. As the Quill
Court observed, a ruling that Due Process permits or precludes a state
from acting leaves no role for Congress because Due Process limits
can only be altered by constitutional amendment. By contrast, as both
Quill and Wayfair recognized under the Commerce Clause, Congress
has very significant powers to prevent states from imposing undue
132. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2017).
133. Id. at 2092.
134. Id. at 2093.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2099.
137. Id. at 2092.
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burdens on interstate and foreign commerce, or it can impose condi-
tions on a state’s exercise of powers that might have an adverse im-
pact on commerce. That fact is quite significant because defendants
and their supporting amici in these cases have expressed concerns not
simply over the state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resi-
dent plaintiffs but over how the state applies some of its rules and
practices to the alleged unfair disadvantage of out-of-state defendants.
Unlike a Due Process approach, which is all or nothing, a Commerce
Clause approach would enable Congress to condition state court juris-
diction over out-of-state defendants on compliance with reasonable
rules and practices, including rules on forum non-conveniens, if it con-
cluded that these objections had merit.
***
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. How would the question
on my final exam be decided under a Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis? From the perspective of the state of the donor, it could
surely enact a law that would forbid fraud in the solicitation of chari-
table contributions from citizens of that state, without any barrier
from the Dormant Commerce Clause. On the university side, the issue
would be: Could the state enact laws that affect charitable gifts made
to institutions in that state consistent with the Dormant Commerce
Clause? Looking only at the question of authority (and not likelihood
of enactment), such laws might require certain disclosure by the recip-
ient to the prospective donor of gifts over some large amount, might
impose a modest tax on such gifts, or might require that all disputes
between a charity and a donor be resolved by binding arbitration, fill-
ing a gap in the Federal Arbitration Act, which applies only to com-
mercial transactions.138 From a Dormant Commerce Clause
perspective, both states would be permitted to exercise personal juris-
diction over the claims of its residents, which is a fair reading of the
decision in Burger King which would have allowed each party to sue
in its home state. Moreover, the issue would be able to be resolved
very quickly with no need for discovery especially of the kind that
would be common after McIntyre.139
138. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2012).
139. Relying on Bristol-Myers, the Court summarily reversed, vacated, and remanded for fur-
ther consideration a decision from the Supreme Court of Arkansas, permitting suit against a
Louisiana sporting goods store for personal injuries sustained while the Arkansas plaintiff was
shopping there, based on extensive efforts of the store to attract business from Arkansas re-
sidents. Simmons Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Lawson, 138 S. Ct. 237 (2017) (mem.), vacating 511
S.W.3d 883 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017). Under a Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, jurisdiction
would plainly be lacking because Arkansas has no legitimate interest in attempting to regulate
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III. A RENEWAL OF AN OLD APPROACH
The plaintiffs in BNSF urged the Supreme Court to uphold jurisdic-
tion in Montana on the ground that the defendant consented to be
sued in the Montana state courts when it registered to do business
there, but the Court declined to resolve that issue in the first in-
stance.140 Those plaintiffs did not pursue that issue on remand, but
other plaintiffs did in a later suit and were rejected by the Supreme
Court of Montana in DeLeon v. BNSF Railway Co.141 That result was
surely correct as a matter of Montana law because “Montana’s regis-
tration statutes specifically provide that the appointment of a regis-
tered agent ‘does not by itself create the basis for personal jurisdiction
over the represented entity in this state.’”142
The notion that a corporation that registers to do business in a state
thereby consents to be sued in that state is hardly a new concept.143
Although that approach failed in Montana, it has been successful to
date in Pennsylvania. The applicable Pennsylvania statute provides
that qualification to do business by a foreign association (which in-
cludes corporations and other similar entities144) “shall constitute a
sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of this Common-
wealth to exercise general personal jurisdiction over such person.”145
Recent decisions from Pennsylvania courts, including both a federal
district court146 and a state Superior Court,147 have upheld the use of
general jurisdiction, despite claims that such an approach was no
longer viable post-Daimler, even though that avenue was expressly
left open in BNSF.
the safety of a business property in another state, no matter how hard the defendant tries to
attract business from non-residents. Therefore, there would be no need for discovery of a re-
mand of the kind the Court ordered in Simmons or any debate on the issue of personal
jurisdiction.
140. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1559 (2017).
141. 426 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2018).
142. Id. at 7 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-7-115 (2015)).
143. See Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes and General Jurisdiction After
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1609, 1611 (2015). This Note, which was written
before the Court specifically left open the issue in BNSF, surveys a wide range of cases and
concludes that Due Process renders all registration-jurisdiction statutes unconstitutional. A more
complete discussion of the question and an analysis of the cases that the Note discussed are
beyond the scope of this Article, which will highlight only a few more recent decisions and
suggest some questions that these statutes raise, including under the Dormant Commerce
Clause, which is not mentioned in the Note.
144. 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 102 (West 2017).
145. 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301(a)(2)–(3) (West 2018).
146. Bors v. Johnson & Johnson, 208 F. Supp. 3d 648, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
147. Webb-Benjamin, LLC v. Int’l Rug Grp., LLC, 192 A.3d 1133, 1139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018).
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In states where there are statutes like the one in Pennsylvania,
plaintiffs will seek to rely on them to argue that consent to personal
jurisdiction is just as valid today as it was when Pennoyer was decided.
Defendants will surely disagree, arguing that Daimler established the
limits of general jurisdiction and that state statutes cannot alter them.
A likely response would be that Daimler set the rules for general juris-
diction based on domicile, but it said nothing about consent. Surely,
despite all the recent personal jurisdiction decisions, a defendant can
still consent to personal jurisdiction in any forum where it has been
sued, and the consent under these statutes differs only because the
consent is in advance and applicable to all future claims.
Assuming that statutory consent in general is a valid concept for
personal jurisdiction, at least two questions are raised. First, is it rea-
sonable to treat what happens in Pennsylvania as consent when the
form that foreign entities file to register to do business does not in-
clude any consent language?148 Moreover, there is nothing in the re-
gistration statutes stating that registration constitutes consent to
general jurisdiction: that rule is found only in the jurisdiction provi-
sion in Title 42, cited in note 145 supra. Second, assuming there is
meaningful consent, the question would be whether there are any con-
stitutional limits when the consent sweeps very broadly. In a case like
Bristol-Myers, in which the defendant was already in state court with
86 plaintiffs, a consent provision might have tipped the scales in favor
of allowing suit by the other 592 plaintiffs with claims involving the
same drug. Or in a case against a railroad in which the employee sued
in his home state for an accident arising elsewhere, it would seem en-
tirely reasonable for a law, like the statute in Pennsylvania, to require
a railroad doing business in that state to have to defend that claim
there. Indeed, the railroad might choose not to contest jurisdiction
because the case does not involve obvious forum shopping.
The more difficult case would involve both the statute and the regis-
tration form specifically stating that registration constitutes consent to
general jurisdiction. And unlike the prior example, the plaintiff does
not sue where the injury occurred or in his home state, but in a state
that has a consent statute and no other connection to the claim. The
defendant would surely argue that the statute, as applied to those
facts, is unconstitutional. But relying on the Due Process Clause here
would be a very steep uphill battle, and its invocation to question a
state statute would establish what my colleague Roger Trangsrud con-
148. Foreign Registration Statement, PA. DEP’T. ST., www.dos.pa.gov/BusinessCharities/Busi
ness/RegistrationForms/Documents/RegForms/15-412%20Foreign%20Registration%20State
ment.pdf (last updated July 1, 2015).
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tended many years ago—that Due Process in this context is plainly
substantive and not procedural.149 On the other hand, if, as this Arti-
cle argues, the proper analysis is under Pike and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, there would be no threshold problem of applying that
provision to that question. Whether the statute creates an “excessive
burden” would be a close question, which might depend on how un-
reasonable the assertion of jurisdiction was in a particular case.
IV. TWO RELATED ISSUES
A. Non-Business Suits Against Individuals
Most of the Court’s most recent personal jurisdiction cases have in-
volved businesses which, by definition, are engaged in commerce, and
there would be no personal jurisdiction issue unless the commerce had
an interstate (foreign) aspect to it. Individuals who engage in commer-
cial activities, as in Burger King, would also have their personal juris-
diction defenses judged by the same Pike standard, with most of the
complexity eliminated because individuals generally act without using
subsidiaries as businesses often do. As for individuals who actually
commit torts that injured the plaintiff in the forum state, surely no one
who negligently drives a car in another state has any basis to avoid
defending a lawsuit there.
One case that does not fit the Dormant Commerce Clause or tradi-
tional tort models is Burnham, where a suit for divorce, alimony, and
child support was filed in California by a wife who moved there from
New Jersey.150 The Court upheld personal jurisdiction because her
husband was personally served when he came to visit the children. But
in the next case, both spouses will stay out of the forum where the
other spouse lives, and the question will arise as to whether either
state can obtain personal jurisdiction to (a) dissolve the marriage, (b)
determine child custody, and (c) award alimony, child support, or
both. These cases are unlikely to arise with any frequency, but as ex-
plained above in Burnham itself, the Due Process Clause has not been
able to provide an agreed upon rationale, as evidenced by the sharp
division in the opinions of the Justices, even though they agreed on
the outcome.
Presumably, the Court will conclude, as the Court did in Pen-
noyer,151 that at least the last state where the couple lived together has
jurisdiction over the “marriage” as a kind of res, but that approach
149. Trangsrud, supra note 25, at 898–903. R
150. Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 607–08 (1990).
151. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 735 (1877).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\68-3\DPL304.txt unknown Seq: 43 29-MAY-19 16:54
2019] SAFE AT HOME 559
may not extend to alimony and child support payments. And it may
not cover cases in which neither spouse continues to reside in the last
jurisdiction where they lived together. But whatever the basis for up-
holding personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, there is surely no
rationale under the Court’s current approach for allowing the plaintiff
to obtain general, rather than specific jurisdiction over the defendant,
as happened in Burnham,152 thus allowing the plaintiff to sue for any
claim between the two, regardless of whether it is related to their mar-
riage or has any connection to the forum state.
Of course, one spouse can always sue in the other’s home state, and
will do so at the point where the lack of a preferable alternative forum
is outweighed by the need to have the dispute resolved. But that is
true in every personal jurisdiction dispute where the real issue is who
will win the forum-shopping battle. However, unlike most personal
jurisdiction cases in which the forum states are essentially agnostic on
whether the dispute is resolved at all, let alone in which court system,
the situation is different in matrimonial matters. In those cases, one
state may have a monetary interest in assuring that one spouse, as well
as any children, receive necessary financial support so that they do not
require state aid for living expenses. In addition, when one spouse
wishes to remarry, the state has its own interest in assuring that such
spouse was properly divorced so that it is not in the position of poten-
tially sanctioning a bigamous relationship.
Neither the Dormant Commerce Clause nor the Due Process
Clause seems to be a proper fit for resolving personal jurisdiction
questions in marriage cases and probably not in some cases involving
the Internet, such as defamation or invasion of privacy, where the de-
fendant is an individual who is being sued over a non-commercial ac-
tivity.153 Full explication of an alternative is beyond the scope of this
Article, but one candidate is the immunity portion of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 3. Like the Dormant
Commerce Clause, with which it has a “mutually reinforcing” rela-
tionship,154 it is designed to protect citizens of one state from being
disadvantaged by the laws of another state. An individual defendant
sued in a forum to which she or he objected would claim an immunity,
152. See discussion supra note 59.
153. Claims of copyright or trademark infringement in a non-commercial context would fall
into this category, but since those claims are based on federal law, they would be brought in
federal court where personal jurisdiction limits may be less significant. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a)
(2012).
154. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978). Although rejecting defendant’s personal
jurisdiction defense, the Court noted in Hess v. Pawloski the possibility of a defendant invoking
the Privileges & Immunities Clause in that connection. 274 U.S. 352, 355–56 (1927).
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and the court would resolve the question by asking whether a citizen
of the forum would be entitled to a similar immunity if that citizen
were sued in another jurisdiction. Thus, if State A were prepared to
subject its citizens to suit outside its borders in the circumstances of
the case before it, then the equality of treatment in interstate matters
that the Clause commands would be met, and there would be no con-
stitutional barrier to suit brought there.155
B. Are Federal Courts Different?
The Court has indicated, but not yet held, that personal jurisdiction
questions would be decided differently if the case were in federal
court. As it has in the past, the Court in Bristol-Myers declined to
decide that question because it was not directly presented there.156 In
his plurality opinion in McIntyre, Justice Kennedy suggested that the
territorial limits on state courts might not apply in federal court.157 In
that same paragraph, he also noted that Congress must first authorize
the federal courts to exercise wider personal jurisdiction beyond the
limits of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1), which restricts even
federal courts to the reach of the state court in which it sits unless
there is an express statute or federal rule creating broader jurisdiction.
Students learn from International Shoe that personal jurisdiction
rules are there to assure fairness to the defendant by not having to
defend a case in an inconvenient forum. With that goal in mind, they
are puzzled, as was Justice Ginsburg in McIntyre,158 by the notion that
the defendant in McIntyre could not be sued in the New Jersey state
court but might be able to be sued in the New Jersey federal court,
which is often across the street from its state counterpart. Similarly
confusing to students is the idea that convenience and fairness can
explain a decision like Bristol-Myers in which a large business was re-
lieved of defending 592 claims in California state court while continu-
ing to have to defend against 86 other, virtually identical claims, save
for the state of residence of the claimant.159 And to the extent that the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the basis of limits on
155. States can (and should) also reduce these problems by sensible venue provisions that
would limit overly broad grants of personal jurisdiction.
156. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017) (citing Omni
Capital Int’l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102 n.5 (1987)). The Advisory Commit-
tee’s Notes with respect to the 1993 amendments to Rule 4(k) stated that federal courts are not
subject to the same territorial limits under the Constitution as are state courts. FED. R. CIV. P.
4(k) advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment.
157. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885–86 (2011).
158. Id. at 904 n.12.
159. 137 S. Ct. at 1779.
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federal court jurisdiction, they wonder why those words should re-
ceive a different construction than the identical words in the Four-
teenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy’s suggestion in McIntyre that
personal jurisdiction may be based on the limited power of the sover-
eign, which is different for a state than a federal court, may provide an
acceptable rationale. That approach, which seems unmoored from no-
tions of Due Process, would nonetheless side-step the anomaly of
reading the same words in the Constitution differently in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
A number of federal statutes, such as those involving antitrust
claims, have provisions for nationwide service of process.160 Because
the conduct at issue in those cases would almost certainly include ac-
tivities in the forum jurisdiction that formed the basis of the plaintiff’s
claim, there would not likely be a problem even under the current
purposeful availment test. Other federal statutes, such as the Inter-
pleader Act,161 provide a number of proper forums, in which at least
some of the claimants may have no connection in the typical case.
Assuming that the Court continues to rely on the Due Process Clause
in order to assess federal court personal jurisdiction in those cases, the
Court could employ something like a national sovereignty theory
under which personal jurisdiction would be proper anywhere in the
United States. If Congress were to make that approach the law of fed-
eral court personal jurisdiction generally, the existing provisions on
venue and transfer would take on much greater significance as a
means of protecting defendants from being sued in very inconvenient
locations.
The current political climate makes it unlikely that Congress will
enact a broad provision allowing substantial numbers of cases now
filed in state court to be filed in federal court to enable plaintiffs a
greater ability to forum shop. On the rules side, it is unclear how much
the Supreme Court would be willing to do through that process, in
addition to the current 100-mile expansion outside of the state’s bor-
ders when a party is sought to be joined under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 14 or 19.162
There are, however, two options under the current rules that may
provide an avenue for plaintiffs whose claims are in federal court and
160. For antitrust claims, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2012) provides:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation may be
brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any
district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335 & 2361 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1393 (repealed 1988).
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(B).
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are met with a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
First, for plaintiffs whose cases have been removed to federal court,
they can argue that the constitutional reach of the state court is no
longer relevant, and the only question should be: Is the Constitution
violated by a federal court entertaining the action? In that situation, a
plaintiff would argue that a defendant that had removed the case to
federal court had in effect consented to have the case heard in federal
court, and therefore the personal jurisdiction question should be the
same as if the case were properly filed in the federal court in the first
instance, i.e., that there is a federal statute or rule specifically provid-
ing for personal jurisdiction in that situation. This approach would be
most appropriate in cases removed to federal court under the Class
Action Fairness Act where Congress has concluded that federal court
removal and adjudication of those claims protects important federal
interests of defendants.163 If consent were found under this rationale,
the federal courts would still be required to answer the question that
the Court again declined to decide in Bristol-Myers, but at least the
lack of a federal statute or rule allowing the case to be filed in federal
court in the first instance would no longer be a problem. Congress
could also achieve the same result by making removal expressly condi-
tioned on limiting personal jurisdiction questions in federal court to
whether the Constitution bars the court from hearing the case before
it.
Second, the current common understanding of Rule 4(k)(1)(A) is
that use of a state long-arm statute in federal court also requires
bringing with it the state court’s limits under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. However, that reading is largely assumed, and it is by no means
compelled by the language of the Rule, any state statutes or rules re-
lied on, or the Constitution. The most recent example of the assump-
tion that the Fourteenth Amendment’s limits apply under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1) to cases filed in federal court can be
seen from the opinion of the district court in what became Walden v.
Fiore in the Supreme Court.164 In dismissing the case for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant, the trial judge stated the appli-
cable law this way:
An analysis of personal jurisdiction has two components. First,
there must be a statute that gives the court authority to exercise
jurisdiction. Second, the exercise of jurisdiction must meet Constitu-
tional due process standards. Id. Because there is no applicable fed-
163. 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (2012) (providing for removal of diversity class actions and making
several ordinary limits on removal inapplicable).
164. Fiore v. Walden, No. 2:07-CV-01674-ECR, 2008 WL 9833854 (D. Nev. 2008).
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eral statute governing personal jurisdiction, our starting point is
Nevada’s long-arm statute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(A) . . . . Ne-
vada’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the
limits of due process. N.R.S. § 14.065 . . . . Thus, our analysis of
personal jurisdiction under Nevada’s long-arm statute and the Con-
stitution collapse into one, and we consider only whether the exer-
cise of jurisdiction comports with the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process requirements.165
But that outcome is far from compelled by the text of Rule 4(k)(1)(A)
which provides:
(1) In General. Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service es-
tablishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant:
(A) who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdic-
tion in the state where the district court is located . . . .166
One thing is clear: There must be a state long-arm statute that autho-
rizes this kind of suit, and if there are limits under state law, Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) brings them along to federal court.
But there is also no language importing the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s limits into the case once it is in federal court other than the
word “jurisdiction,” which by no means requires that interpretation.
Surely, if the intent and language of the state long-arm statute were
considered, it would compel the opposite conclusion. Thus, Nevada’s
statute at issue in Walden permitted the Nevada courts to entertain
cases as follows: “A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction over a
party to a civil action on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion of this state or the Constitution of the United States.”167 There is
no specific reference to the Fourteenth Amendment but simply to the
limits imposed by the United States Constitution. Assuming that fed-
eral courts are not subject to the same constitutional limit as are state
courts, reading Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(1)(A) to be re-
stricted only by limits on federal courts—not state courts—would
raise no constitutional barriers to a broader interpretation of that rule.
Finally, to the extent that fairness to the defendant and avoiding
inconvenience are relevant considerations, the general federal venue
statute168 and the federal transfer statute169 would address any such
165. Id. at *2 (internal citations omitted).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A)
167. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.065 (West 2000). The comparable provision of California law
at issue in Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014), contains virtually identical expan-
sive language: California state courts may exercise personal jurisdiction “on any basis not incon-
sistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States.” CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 410.10 (West 2004).
168. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2012).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012).
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issues in virtually every imaginable case. And if they do not, Congress
can fix the problem or delegate the task to the Supreme Court’s
rulemaking process. To be sure, further consideration may suggest
flaws in this approach, but for now, plaintiffs who are concerned with
the current state court limits on jurisdiction imposed by the Supreme
Court should consider making these arguments to keep a case in a
federal court in a district in which the state court would lack personal
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
The proposal advanced in this Article would make a major change
in the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, although
not necessarily in the outcome of many recent cases. However, for the
reasons explained above, a shift from a Due Process to a Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis would produce fairer, simpler, and more
coherent results as defendants seek to confine the forum in more and
more lawsuits to places where they are safely at home.
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APPENDIX
This appendix contains an exact replication of the final exam prob-
lem I wrote and administered to my civil procedure class for the fall
semester of 2016.
FINAL EXAM
CIVIL PROCEDURE – SECTION 6212-21
DEAN ALAN MORRISON
DECEMBER 13, 2016
QUESTION I
Old Blue University in Connecticut embarked on a massive fun-
draising campaign to build a new science center on its main campus
there. In addition to tapping alums and foundations across the coun-
try, it reached out to leading entrepreneurs who had made their for-
tunes based on significant advances in science, including some who
had never studied or taught at Old Blue.
In the course of their research, the development office at Old Blue
came across the name Irving Innovator, who lives in California. Inno-
vator created the operating system that is the centerpiece of all mili-
tary and civilian drones in the US, for which he obtained a patent that
has made him a billionaire. The development office sent him a letter
explaining the plans for a new science center and suggested a follow-
up telephone call. A few weeks later, a mid-level staff person in that
office visited Innovator at his California office. By that time, the plans
for the new science center had been posted on Old Blue’s website, and
Innovator was directed there for further details.
At this point, the development office decided that it would try to
arrange a meeting between the university’s president and Innovator.
Innovator rarely travels, but was scheduled to come to New York
City, and the president agreed to meet him there. At that meeting, the
president proposed that Innovator donate $10 million dollars and that
the university name the wing to be devoted to physics in Innovator’s
honor. The proposal, which was subsequently reduced to writing in
the form of a binding pledge, provided that Innovator would donate
$1 million within 30 days, that an announcement would be made as to
the naming within an additional 60 days, and that Innovator would
donate an additional $2 million within six months and the remaining
$5 million with two years. The pledge agreement stated that it will be
governed by the laws of Connecticut. It also contained directions for
sending the payments under it to the Next to Last National Bank’s
branch in Old Haven, Connecticut.
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Innovator made the first donation, and the university made the an-
nouncement as promised. It also scheduled the opening of the Center
for May 2018, and Innovator promised he would attend. Shortly there-
after, the university made another announcement: The science center
as a whole will be named The Troll Center for the Advancement of
Science, after Ted Troll who gave $50 million from his fortune made
by suing patent infringers. Troll obtained his patents from individuals
and universities who could not figure out how to get them to market.
But instead of using those patents to make useful products, Troll
found major companies that were infringing them, which he sued,
often recovering very large sums.
Innovator was outraged because his company was the main defen-
dant in one of Troll’s suits, which it grudgingly settled for $35 million.
He immediately contacted Old Blue and demanded that the Center
not be named for Troll. When that idea was rebuffed (Troll had al-
ready donated $30 million), Innovator sent the university an email de-
manding his $1 million back. He also stated that he considered his
pledge to be voided and hence would not donate the remaining $ 9
million. He further asserted that the university knew of the plan to
name the Center for Troll before Innovator agreed to his pledge and
deliberately withheld that information from him because it knew of
his antagonism for Troll.
Both parties then sued in their own state courts, and in each case
the defendant properly and timely removed the case to federal court.
Before motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction were filed,
the parties agreed to submit the issue of personal jurisdiction to none
other than your civil procedure professor with an unusual request:
pick the forum for which the plaintiff has the stronger case for per-
sonal jurisdiction, even if the conclusion is that there may not be per-
sonal jurisdiction in either forum.
You are a research assistant for the professor. He asks you to write
a memo assessing the strengths and weakness of each side’s assertion
of jurisdiction in their home state, and then a brief conclusion as to
which one has the better claim and why. He also tells you that the
applicable jurisdictional statutes in both Connecticut and California
provide for personal jurisdiction “to the maximum extent permitted
by the Constitution.”
